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DEDICATION
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“You could carry your burdens lightly or with great effort. You could worry about
tomorrow or not. You could imagine horrible fates or garland-filled tomorrows. None
of it mattered as long as you moved, as long as you did something. Asking why was
fine, but it wasn’t action. Nothing brought the rewards of moving, of running.”
-Scott Jurek
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ABSTRACT
The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program is an
interagency, multiple-stakeholder organization, which works to enable cooperative
solutions to endangered species issues on New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande. The
Program is a product of what some authors describe as a “new age” of environmental
management. This study focuses on how local stakeholders interact with federal and state
agencies within the Program to cooperatively invest in institutional changes to solve
problems with tools of the “new age” environmental management paradigm. It evaluates
these tools in the context of pitfalls presented by dynamic interactions and an imbedded
“rule of law” regulatory system and culture. It finds that disparities in influence between
v

stakeholders who represent common objectives but disagree upon Program trajectories
can diminish buy-in among the less influential parties. Less influential stakeholders in
these scenarios may feel greater advantage pursuing litigious alternatives that threaten the
longevity of the program. Such threats reinforce the “rule of law” status quo which
enables guaranteed protections to environmental goods or water rights, but falls short of
realistic solutions to the problems of the Middle Rio Grande.
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1. Introduction
The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program
(“MRGESCP” or “Program”) is an interagency, multiple-stakeholder organization, which
came about in the early 2000’s to enable cooperative solutions to endangered species
issues on New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande (MRG) (MRGESCP 2012 Draft ). The
program has attempted, with some success, to bridge political gaps and seek solutions to
habitat and flow regime issues present on the MRG. However, it grapples with deeply
challenging structural issues that manifest in inefficiency, territorial posturing and
confusion over the scientific realities the Program faces. Program participants are divided
as to how they expect and desire the future to play out, and they have varying levels of
confidence regarding its current trajectory. These factors combined threaten the
capabilities of various players to invest in institutional advances.
The Program, which has focused on avoidance of species jeopardy for the Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow and Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, is currently attempting to
develop a new trajectory toward species recovery. It is simultaneously contending with
(1) the pressures of reinitiating the consultation process for a new Biological Opinion
(BO) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act), (2) a progressively critical
drought situation and (3) continually decreased funding to support the Program.
Cooperation and patience are at many times strained, and participants are uncertain as to
how the program’s future will play out.
The MRGESCP employs collaborative processes and is developing an adaptive
management (AM) protocol for its activities. Both are hallmarks of many of the largescale river restoration projects currently underway in the U.S. (Freeman 2010). The
1

program’s main catalyst is the ESA, and in employing collaboration and AM, the
MRGESCP qualifies as part of what some authors call a “new age” environmental
management paradigm that developed out of 1990’s effort to transform ESA
implementation (Sax 2001, Doremus 2001).
This study focuses on the evolution in environmental management techniques
included in this “new age” and how they may be affected by the challenges of collective
mobilization of resources and the existing regulatory structure in the context of a specific
program. Central to developments is the concept of biodiversity and a focus on habitat
restoration and protection in response to what most scientists agree to be an extinction
crisis (Sax 2001, Salzman and Thompson 2010). This is reflected in 1990’s policy
amendments to the ESA and the initiation of multiple large-scale river/ecological
restoration programs in the same time period (Doremus 2001, Babbit 2005, Gerlak 2008).
The “new age” is driven from another direction as well. Implementation of the
ESA is no less a social and political issue (Freeman 2010). The ESA is arguably the most
powerful environmental statute in the world and with that distinction; it is also one of the
most controversial (Salzman and Thompson 2010). The ESA provides only minimal
consideration of cost to economies or industry in its designation of species critical
habitat. Otherwise it explicitly ignores economic concerns (Ibid.). Many have viewed its
neglect of these factors to render its goals impractical and politically unachievable
(Doremus 2001). The introduction of collaborative processes and adaptive management
in large-scale restoration projects stems in large part from a need to make the ESA
flexible and accountable to social, political and economic considerations (Freeman 2010).
Effectively, these reforms serve to protect the Act itself from political attack in congress,
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but challenge the confidence of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
(ENGOs) (Ibid.).
Each of the collaborative river restoration programs is unique and heavily
influenced by local dynamics. Because of its neglect of economic concerns, the ESA is
possibly detrimental to the regulated community (Doremus 2006 from Scott et al. 2006).
Therefore, the success of a given program may hinge heavily on local dynamics. This
study frames ESA-driven collaborative programs as the product of both regulation and
the incentives and interests of stakeholders with a specific focus on the regulated
community’s interaction in partnership with regulators and action agencies and the
resulting structure of risk and incentive. It investigates what factors mobilize these
partners to invest in and supply institutions that benefit all partners. This investment is
termed “Institutional Supply” by Ostrom (1990). Its successful provision is hindered by
the potential for some partners to take advantage of collectively supplied institutions
while investing little themselves. The study examines how partners are able to overcome
these “second-order collective dilemmas” (free-riding) in the provision of institutions that
allow them to avoid jeopardizing and actually aid in species recovery, while also
protecting current and future water rights. It uses concepts of institutional change
developed in Ostrom (1990) and looks at how well the program has been able to (1)
achieve collaboration, (2) whether the incentives for activity are geared toward mutual
gains, and (3) achieve protection of species or produce shelter for various parties from
regulation and liability. It relies significantly on work conducted by Freeman (2010) with
regard to the specific application of Ostrom’s theories to another large-scale, ESA driven
river restoration program on the Platte River. Finally it focuses on literature regarding the
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regulatory system and culture and its affect on collaboration in the MRG. The Program is
then assessed regarding how well it meets the challenges of mobilizing investment. The
methods being employed in the Program (i.e. collaboration and adaptive management)
are evaluated to see whether the factors that are required for successful collaborative
implementation of ESA compliance are present and whether this situation is the proper
venue for application of the “new age” management paradigm. This study was conducted
through the use of observation of group meetings, semi-structured interviews with
participants and analysis of program documents.

4

2. Study Question and Goal
The overarching research question for this study is: what mobilizes or prevents
the MRGESCP’s partners’ or potential partners’ investment of time and resources to
participate in collaborative, adaptive implementation of the Endangered Species Act?
This study contributes to the understanding of collaborative implementation of the
Endangered Species Act on three levels. It provides a case study of a program that has
not previously been evaluated under Ostrom’s framework of collective mobilization of
institutional supply. This is of use as a component of a broader study of stakeholder
dynamics in similar large-scale river restoration activities. Its findings can be generalized
to evaluate the “new age” methods being employed, as the study demonstrates how local
dynamics interact with broader policy goals to either reinforce or call into question the
methods of collaboration and adaptive management. On a practical level, the results of
this study serve as a critical assessment of the Program, which program partners can use
to amend their actions or governance framework to achieve a more successful program.

5

3. Background
3.1 History of the MRGESCP
The ecology of the MRG has been dramatically altered by human modification of
the river and surrounding flood plain (Phillips 2010). Between 36% and 73% of native
fish species have been completely eliminated from the river system while over twenty
exotic species have been introduced. Exotic vegetation and fish, climate change and
progressive growth in water demands will increasingly threaten the native species that
exist today (newmexiconaturalhistory.org 2012).
One of the two ESA-listed species, the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
(Hybognathus amarus) (minnow) now occupies around 5% of its original range (Ibid).
The minnow was listed as endangered in 1994 followed by a migratory bird, the
Southwestern Willow Flycatcher (Empidonax traillii extimus) (flycatcher) in 1995.1
Critical habitat was first designated in 1999 and 2003 for the minnow and revised in 2005
for the flycatcher (59 FR 36995, July 20, 1994, codified in 50 CFR §17.11, Federal
Register, Volume 60 #38 1995, 64 FR 36274, July 6, 1999).
Drought conditions in 1996 saw the entire flow of the river diverted at the San
Acacia diversion dam (Figure 1). This resulted in a significant minnow kill and the
initiation of the San Juan-Chama Project (SJCP)2 Supplemental Water Operations
Program by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). The critical habitat designation
was challenged in court by local conservancy district serving irrigators- the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD). Meanwhile, environmental non-governmental

1

For complete description of the ESA and its mechanics including Listing, Critical Habitat, “Take”,
Section 7, Biological Opinions (BO) and others see section 3.2 below.
2
For complete description of the San Juan-Chama Project see section 3.3 below.
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organizations (ENGOs) sued Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for
failing to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service) under the
ESA for their MRG water operations (Kelly 2011). The City of Albuquerque (City)3,
MRGCD and Rio Chama Acequia Association all intervened in litigation as claimants of
the diversions in question. As a result of this litigation, a court order forced recipients of
San Juan Chama Project water to lease water for purposes of sustaining the minnow and
for irrigation (Ibid.). Under an agreed order, additional water was pumped from the lowflow conveyance channel north of Elephant Butte Reservoir, the City of Albuquerque’s
artificial minnow refugium was developed, and support for MRGCD efficiency
operations initiated (Ibid).
In 2001, congressional appropriations were authorized for a collaborative program
to begin various projects to help the minnow, and FWS issued a three-year Biological
Opinion (BO) to cover ongoing actions under the ESA. A second BO was released in
2003 to cover the Program and its partner’s activities in the MRG for ten years. In 2004,
Congress passed the “minnow rider” which directed the Secretary of the Interior to
establish an Executive Committee (EC) and implement a 75/25 federal/ non-federal cost
sharing provision. It also specified that SJCP water could only be used for species
purposes if leased by Reclamation from willing sellers, and protected action agencies
from litigation if compliant with the 2003 BO (H.R. 2754-23§208). In 2009, the EC
began efforts to transition the collaborative program to a Recovery Implementation
Program (RIP) in order to enhance the focus of the program on recovery. In 2011 the EC
agreed to follow an AM protocol for the Program’s activities (MRGESCP 2012 Draft).
3

The City of Albuquerque’s municipal water supply is now managed by the Albuquerque/Bernalillo
County Water Utility Authority (ABCWUA or Authority), a separate entity and signatory created since the
original litigation.
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Currently, the Program suffers from the cumulative effects of pressures it faces in
the run up to the expiration of the 2003 BO. Specifically, the timeline for completion of
the RIP documentation has been overrun and consequently will not initially be included
in the 2013 BO. Details regarding the development of RIP at issue include: controversy
regarding structural changes such as third-party management of the RIP, and a lack of
clarity regarding how the FWS will gauge sufficient progress of regulated partners under
the RIP. This has spurred a game of “chicken” in which partners, action agencies and the
FWS all appear to want another party to make the first commitment. At the same time, a
rift has grown between the two action agencies, the Corps and Reclamation over whether
to implement a joint consultation with FWS. Cumulatively, the effect has been to overrun
the deadline for completion of the new BO in early 2013. This rescheduling has created a
seven-month opening before completion of the 2013 BO in which the minnow rider’s
protection against litigation is no longer valid.
Currently, the program has invoked language in the 2003 BO to extend ESA
coverage during resolution of the above stated issues. Interviews and observations of EC
meetings reveal a general mood of frustration and wariness among many partners as the
above mentioned protection from litigation expires on March 16, 2013.
3.2 Complexities of Regulated Rivers
Challenges to watershed management include the regulated factors of clean water
and air, endangered species, irrigated agriculture and land use management at the federal
and state level. Each western state has similar yet diverse allocation laws for surface
water and ground water. Each phenomenon is administered by different agencies at
federal, state and tribal levels (Gillon 2002).
8

3.2.1 The ESA and other relevant regulatory structures
The federal ESA is a key factor in most of the collaborative river governance
programs in the U.S. (Karkainnen 2002). The ESA is summarized by Benson (2010):
Section 4 of the ESA requires the FWS or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to
list threatened or endangered species. Once a species is listed, a number of protections
immediately fall into place. It becomes illegal to “take” a listed species, with limited
exceptions.4 The term “take” is broadly defined to include any actions that harm the
species, including “habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering” (50 CFR § 17.3). Listing also triggers the requirement that the
appropriate wildlife agency designate critical habitat for the species either concurrently
with the listing of the species or within one year of listing. Critical habitat designation
becomes important in large part because the proposed adverse modification of critical
habitat triggers the ESA’s consultation requirement. Under Section 7 of the ESA, all
federal agencies are required to consult with the appropriate wildlife agency to ensure
that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or
result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. The consultation process
applies to all federal actions, broadly interpreted by the courts to include not only direct
construction projects but also the granting of licenses and contracts and the promulgation
of regulations (Sullins 2001). Once an action agency determines that its proposed
activity “may affect and is likely to affect” the species, the wildlife agency issues a BO,
which includes an analysis of whether the proposed action is “likely to jeopardize the
4

Prohibition Against “Take”;ESA Section 9 (16 U.S. C. § 1540) It is illegal to “take” a listed species
without a permit under Sections 7 or 10. Seldom enforced against private parties due to burden of proof
issues—must show “actual injury” to listed species.
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continued existence of the species or adversely modify designated critical habitat.” (16
U.S. C. § 1536) If a jeopardy determination is made, the BO identifies any “reasonable
and prudent alternatives” (RPAs) that would allow the action agency to move forward
with the proposed activity. A BO includes an “Incidental Take Statement,” anticipating
that some take of species may result from the proposed project. The Incidental Take
Statement outlines terms and conditions designed to reduce the impact of the anticipated
“take” that are binding on the action agency (USFWS 2007).
The Clean Water Act (CWA) sets about to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters”, prohibits “Discharge of toxic
pollutants,” provides for “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on water.” The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) accomplishes this by setting effluent limits
based on technology and economics for hundreds of pollutants for categories of
dischargers with state determined ambient water quality levels for receiving waters
(Gillon 2002).
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) forces agencies to produce an
Environmental Impact Statement for any federal action that may impair the environment.
Counsel on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations call on federal agencies to
“Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives to the proposed
actions and devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including
the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits…include the
alternative of no action and include appropriate mitigation measures not already included
in the proposed action or alternatives.” The environmental consequences of this section
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of the EIS “forms the scientific and analytic basis” for the comparison of alternatives.
Once an action is deemed to have a significant impact, mitigation measures must be
developed where feasible (Ibid.)
Most western states water allocation systems are based on some version of the
prior appropriation system. The system at its core allocates rights to appropriators to
make beneficial use of water diverted from a watercourse. Senior (prior) appropriators
have the better right and if “relation back” and continuous use can be proven, the date of
intent to appropriate, or application for permit, stands as the date of appropriation. During
shortages, junior users are cutoff and all parties’ rights must be exercised continuously to
avoid forfeiture. However, each state’s water rights will be variously adjudicated or not
and different systems of delivery and administration will exist depending on how special
districts interact with state law and federal water management agencies (Tarlock et al
2009).
Each major river will have a “Law if the River” that embodies the products of
decades of litigation and negotiation among the river’s users. Among these are interstate
compacts, which are agreed between states and enacted by congress (Tarlock et al 2009,
Gillon 2002). Federal and State laws mentioned already, international treaties and Indian
water rights are included as well as vestiges of indigenous culture and Spanish and
Mexican laws and grants (Gillon 2002).
3.2.2 Agency Overlap and sharing of responsibility
The existence of so many regulatory components in river management means that
multiple agencies, each responsible for a small portion of the responsibility for river
governance will interact at all levels of government. At the federal level, Reclamation
11

maintains dams and diversion structures and irrigation works administering water
delivery for various contracted recipients and individuals with state-permitted water
rights. It is the nation’s largest wholesaler of water and second largest producer of hydroelectricity (Susskind et al 2010). The Corps, manages projects, maintains navigation
channels, and operates and maintains reservoirs and levees to control floods. It also
manages hydroelectric power generation. FWS and NMFS administer the ESA and the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act to protect fish and wildlife not listed under the ESA
whose survival may be jeopardized by federal actions. The CWA requires EPA to set
water quality standards for and control discharges into surface waters. State agencies may
also exist to administer a state’s duties under interstate compacts and municipal and tribal
governments, and special districts may each have responsibility for management of the
same water as it travels from purpose to purpose (Gillon 2002).
3.3 The Middle Rio Grande Management Context
Specific to the MRG are several factors of importance to specific stakeholders’
roles. These include the SJCP, the Rio Grande Compact (Compact), Tribal Trust
obligations of federal agencies, and Prior and Paramount (P&P) water rights.

12

Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Relevant
Locations and Activities (MRGESCP, 2012)
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3.3.1 The San Juan Chama Project
Reclamation offers this description of the SJCP: The San Juan-Chama Project
consists of a system of diversion structures and tunnels for trans-mountain movement of
water from the San Juan River Basin to the Rio Grande Basin. Authorized as a
participating project of the Colorado River Storage Project, the San Juan-Chama Project
provides an average annual diversion of about 110,000 acre-feet of water from the upper
tributaries of the San Juan River. Primary purposes of the San Juan-Chama Project are to
furnish a water supply to the middle Rio Grande Valley for municipal, domestic, and
industrial uses. The project is also authorized to provide supplemental irrigation water
and incidental recreation and fish and wildlife benefits. Water is supplied for the
following municipal, domestic, and industrial purposes: city of Albuquerque, 48,200
acre-feet; city and county of Santa Fe, 5,605 acre-feet; city of Los Alamos, 1,200 acrefeet; village of Los Lunas, 400 acre-feet; Twining Water and Sanitation District, 15 acrefeet; city of Espanola, 1,000 acre-feet; village of Taos, 400 acre-feet; town of Belen, 500
acre-feet; town of Benalillo, 400 acre-feet; and Jicarilla Apaches, 6,500 acre-feet.
Supplemental water is provided for irrigation of 89,711 acres in the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District, 20,900 acre-feet; and 2,768 acres in the Pojoaque Valley Irrigation
District, 1,030 acre-feet. An annual allocation of about 5,000 acre-feet is available for the
Corps of Engineer's Cochiti Reservoir for fish and wildlife and recreation purposes to
maintain a minimum pool of 1,200 surface acres. There is an allocated but as yet uncontracted supply of 4,990 acre-feet (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2013).
3.3.2 The Rio Grande Compact
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Signed in 1938, with Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas as parties and approved
by Congress in 1939, the Rio Grande Compact apportions the waters of the Rio Grande
above Ft. Quitman, Texas, among the three states. It provides for administration by a
commission consisting of the state engineers of Colorado and New Mexico, a
commissioner appointed by the Governor of Texas, and a representative of the United
States. The commission meets annually in March. The Rio Grande Compact establishes
water delivery obligations and depletion entitlements for Colorado and New Mexico.
Given the variable climate, it provides for debits and credits to be carried over from year
to year until extinguished under provisions of the compact.
Accrued credits or debits are an important element of compact accounting. The
engineer advisors to the compact commissioners meet prior to the Rio Grande Compact
Commission to determine scheduled and actual delivery of water under the compact. The
U.S. Geological Survey acts as Secretary to the compact commission under an annual
cooperative agreement, prepares monthly and annual reports, and maintains the official
compact commission files (NMISC 2013).
In recent years the State of New Mexico has been accumulating credit “surpluses”
due in part to the construction of more efficient channels into Elephant Butte, but
primarily the fact that there have not been big water years. This seems counter intuitive
but is based in proportion of water lost in carriage (carriage losses to infiltration and
evapo-transpiration) between high versus low water years. New Mexico’s maximum
allocation is 405 thousand acre-feet (kaf) in the MRG and everything above that has to be
delivered. A portion of the water gets lost in the system, but New Mexico’s full
obligation to Texas is still due. Losses are made up for by accruing debits (Interview).

15

New Mexico has to deliver a smaller percentage of flows experienced in smaller
water years. Carriage losses for this smaller percentage are proportionally small enough
that it is more likely to over-deliver in low flow years and under-deliver in high flow
years. In a bigger water year, the carriage losses in the system are proportionally so large
that New Mexico loses everything and has to subtract its own local inflows and deliver
them to Texas. Bigger water years create debits in New Mexico’s compact accounting;
smaller water years create credits (Ibid.).
The State can also, over time, accumulate surpluses. Article 7 of the Compact also
commonly applies to low flow years. Article 7 dictates that if there is less than 400 kaf of
water usable for the Rio Grande Project stored in Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs,
New Mexico is prohibited from storing any water in upstream reservoirs that were
constructed after 1929. Under those restrictions the snowmelt runoff must be allowed run
through the system to get to Elephant Butte. An exception to this rule states that, if New
Mexico has a credit surplus at Elephant Butte, it can relinquish that surplus to
(hydrologic) Texas (Elephant Butte Irrigation District in New Mexico and El Paso One in
Texas). New Mexico may then store that equal amount in its upstream reservoirs over
time as a means of making it available for use in the MRG. New Mexico has been
distributing its accrued surplus allocation of storage and release rights primarily to the
MRGCD, to some degree to municipalities, and leasing that water to Reclamation (Ibid.).
3.3.3 Pueblo water rights and Tribal Trust Obligations
“The (New Mexico) Pueblos' water rights are based upon laws spanning hundreds
of years and several crowns” (Mann 2007 pp.1). Having “distinguished the Pueblo tribes,
who lived in concentrated village settlements, from the Navajo and Apache, who were
16

nomadic,” the Spanish “recognized and protected Pueblo land holdings and water rights”
(Ibid). “In 1848, the United States acquired the New Mexico Territory, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed the Pueblos' property rights acquired under the Spanish
and Mexican governments” (Ibid.). “In 1924, Congress passed the "Pueblo Lands Act"”
in which “the United States government acknowledged a trust relationship between it and
the Pueblos” (Ibid.). “Congress protected the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos’ "prior and
paramount" (P&P) right to the water necessary to irrigate their 8,346 acres of historically
irrigated land (the Secretary of the Interior later increased this to 8,847 acres) within the
boundaries of the MRGCD and 15,000 acres (later reduced to 11,074.40) of Pueblo land
that could be "newly reclaimed" by the Conservancy Project. However, even today the
full extent of the Six Pueblos' water rights has yet to be determined.” (Ibid.).
3.3.4 Roles of Signatories to the MRGESCP
The MRGESCP combines sixteen signatory partner entities in a collaborative body meant
to facilitate shared responsibility for management of MRG endangered species and various water
uses. Most entities have both mandatory agency and Program related duties that affect their roles
within the program. These roles are summarized as follows:
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Table 1: Roles of Program Signatories
• Only Federal Regulatory Agency Signatory to the MRGESCP
• Charged with Administration of the ESA and Section 7 Consultation
o Develops BO and makes finding of jeopardy/non-jeopardy
o Develops RPA’s in consultation with action agencies
• Main scientific entity in program
o Ascertains species health and effects of agency action
• Dual role as partner and regulator simultaneously
FWS
o Facilitates permitting for various Program activities (research/restoration)
o Regulates compliance
o Final authority on all Program activities
• Role deviates from classic ESA administration model in that the agency is partnered with agencies, municipalities, the
quasi-public special district, tribes, and NGOs (APA, potentially Environmental)

Reclamation

Corps

• Lead federal action agency in ESA Section 7 Consultations
• Critical source of funding to MRGESCP
o Contributes personnel including Federal Chair Person and staff
o Secures grant funds for restoration and Program Functions
o Leases water from willing sellers of SJCP water and Compact Credits
• Provides water in Western U.S. to contracted recipients of federal projects
o Water provision role integrally ties its activities to those of other water users
o Holds title to MRGCD works including El Vado Dam (MRGCD not a federal project)
o Does not hold discretion over MRGCD activities
o Operates SJCP which distributes project water to municipalities and agricultural interests.
• Second Federal Action Agency in ESA Consultation
• 2003 BO focused on Corps dam operations
o RPA’s required Corps to participate in habitat restoration under its various other authorities.
• Corps manages waters of the MRG, Rio Chama, and other tributaries for flood control ("controls floodgates")
o Standard operations require impounding of water at Cochiti Dam only when safe channel capacity is exceeded
o Safe channel capacity at Albuquerque is 7000 cfs
• (Cochiti Deviation) Corps may deviate from standard ops to provide water for species management if water is made
available to do so by another water right holding entity.
o Corps has no water rights and no duty to deliver water for irrigation or municipal use.
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MRGCD

ABCWUA

ISC

APA

• Major non-federal actor in MRGESCP
o Original litigant in minnow litigation, activities strongly effect species
o Has water and other assets
• Formed in 1923 to administer flood control, drainage and delivery
o Enabled by state law
o Quasi-public entity can tax residents of benefitted area
o Not subject to NEPA compliance as are federal agencies
o Consolidated original MRG diversion points to four which increased efficiency while making assessment payer’s
dependent on system.
• MRGCD provides water for various Program needs and participates in various work groups
o Water rights are held by Assessment Payers
o MRGCD receives some SJCP water which it can lease
• The Authority is another important stakeholder in the MRGESCP• It is the largest provider of municipal water in the
state o It serves Bernalillo County and the City of Albuquerque o It is the largest user of SJCP water and leases a
portion of that water to Reclamation for Program purposes• The Authority’s role in the program is cooperative,
supplying or timing water releases with species needs according to FWS.• The Authority has its own ESA coverage
under the SJCP BO.
• (New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission) is another important stakeholder in the Program
o ISC is responsible for New Mexico’s obligations under the Rio Grande Compact.
o Were one of the Interveners in the original minnow litigation
• ISC has ability to obtain funds from the state legislature and has ongoing working relationship with Reclamation in
maintenance of pilot channel into Elephant Butte Reservoir
• As a program partner the ISC has created habitat and artificial refugia for the silvery minnow and worked with
MRGCD to improve efficiency.
• It serves as a prodding influence on Reclamation to increase productivity.
• (Assessment Payers Association of the MRGCD) An organization that represents (approx. 600) assessment paying
irrigators and residents of the benefitted area of the MRGCD
o Formed in the 1970’s as a watchdog organization over the MRGCD in attempt to constrain rate increases proposed
by the district
o Irrigators’ livelihoods are directly threatened by limitations the ESA may impose on their water use.

19

Pueblos

City

Environmental
NGOs

• Four MRG Pueblos are signatory to the MRGESCP
o Pueblos hold the most senior water rights in the system (See Prior and Paramount water rights (P&P) description in
body of text)
o Pueblos role in the Program has been representative of Tribal interests and substantive in the way of habitat
restoration
• P&P water rights are guaranteed safe from Compact necessities and Tribes retain the right to future development of
those rights
o 2003 BO acknowledges that shortages may occur in the future due to rights of development
o FWS believes that nothing in the 2003 BO impairs use of Tribal waters but admits of possibility of infringement on
Tribal Trust duties of action agencies
o 2003 BO also notes that Tribes do not concede that the ESA applies to their actions
• Has representative and substantive roles in the MRGESCP
o The City represents nearly 600,000 constituents
o It manages 2,500 acres of open space in the Rio Grande Bosque
o It originally represented Albuquerque’s water use before the formation of the ABCWUA
o The City’s activities have a minimal need for ESA coverage
• The City receives Program funding to participate in habitat restoration and run the Bio-Park rearing facility (minnow
hatchery) that contributes to the Program’s population augmentation program.
•Have played a crucial role in the development of the MRGESCP though they are not currently signatories to the
Program
o As important members of the early stages of the collaborative process they were involved in drafting long term
solutions to species problems.
• Litigation brought by these NGOs forced federal actions, started the consultation process and eventually prompted
congress to establish the official collaborative program.
• NGOs left the collaborative table as the Program evolved into a more “hardened, federal-like bureaucratic” structure.
Calculations of NGO effectiveness, given limited resources, in the “biased” collaborative forum caused NGOs to
believe that their goals were not practically attainable from within the Program.
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4. Literature Review
This study depends upon the concept of institutional supply and its provision
developed in Ostrom (1990). Institutional supply is a component of collective action that
refers to provision of and investment in institutions for governance used in evaluating the
management of common pool resources (CPRs) or resources shared as a commons
among multiple dependent parties. Many of the principles involved in evaluating
management of CPRs are applicable to collaborative processes being implemented in
modern “new age” river restoration programs (Freeman 2010). The relevance of
application of these principles is strongly influenced by the structure of the program and
how it fits with the regulatory system in place. In the case of water resources and
endangered species, applying collective action and the CPR lens is complicated because,
while a public resource, water in the Western United States is managed under a welldeveloped system of private usufructuary rights protected under state law. Demands of
the federal ESA and agency mandates further confine options developed in a
collaborative forum. Complicated as application of this lens is, Ostrom’s questions for
evaluating institutional supply investment do attend directly to existence of peripheral
regulatory structures (Ostrom 1990). One question here may be to what extent the
regulatory system is peripheral to the resource management taking place.
While emphasized in the modern management paradigm, collaboration can be
hindered or advanced by both the regulatory system and the social-political situations of
those involved. This literature review will dissect these various factors beginning with the
theoretical and political reasons for shifting from a strict command-and-control
regulatory model to collaborative processes and adaptive management. Institutional
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supply and stakeholder investment mobilization will then be discussed followed by a
study of the interaction between collaborative processes and the regulatory system and
culture.
4.1 The “New Age” of Environmental Management
The combination of social and economic concerns and the impending realities of
an uncertain biological and climatic future have lead to an academic dialogue concerning
how to protect bio-diversity, increase social and ecological resilience and increase the
ability of social/ecological systems to adapt to disturbance or systemic change. These
must all be integrated into policy and paradigm if effective management will be possible
(Chapin et al 2009, Chap.1).
In broad perspective, the reasoning behind this dialogue is threefold. Biodiversity
is in crisis and thus the building blocks of human society are in jeopardy (Sax 2001). The
concept of stationarity5, on which water management planning is based, is nullified by
climate change and with that, our perceptions of adaptive capacity are in need of reconsideration (Milly et al. 2008, Craig 2009). Finally, intra-disciplinary foci in social
sciences and ecology don’t adequately intersect human activities within ecology and thus
limit development of effective management solutions to the intensive environmental
degradation currently taking place (Liu et. Al 2007, Ostrom 2009).
These factors of extinction, adaptive capacity and human/ecological relationship
are broadly attended by the concept of resilience based stewardship which enables
managers [and planners] “to respond to and shape change in social-ecological systems

5

The concept that future probabilities of flood and drought cycles can be derived from the instrument
record (Milly et al. 2008).
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(SES) in order to sustain the supply and opportunities for use of ecosystem services by
society” (Chapin et al. 2009 pp.29).
To take the three issues above individually, the emerging inability of planners and
engineers to predict future conditions based on probabilities derived from instrument
records (stationarity) is mitigated by increasing and enabling a SES’s ability to adapt to
various system disturbances or systemic changes. The concept of adaptive management
(AM) arises from this perspective. AM is a multi-step, iterative process for conducting
scientific study of management actions by the implementation and rigorous monitoring of
hypothetically developed management action scenarios (Williams, Szaro and Shapiro
2009, Smith 2011). The goal is to be flexible in management when new information is
acquired or systems change. AM is a hallmark of many large-scale river restoration
programs including, tentatively the MRGESCP.
It is also advocated that restoration and preservation be re-conceptualized to
advance the idea that baseline conditions are and have always been dynamic (Craig
2009). Restoration should be a function of relieving human constraints to allow systems
to develop their own balance based on current conditions (C.A. Frissell and S.C. Ralph
from Naiman and Bilby 1998).
The factors of biodiversity loss and the coupling of human systems with
ecological systems are interdependent within this study’s concern with the ESA. Social
and ecological sciences have tended to focus on intra-disciplinary subject matter to the
extent that human systems and ecological systems are inadvertently rendered
conceptually distinct (Liu et Al 2007). Where this distinction has influenced policy, the
substantive result is insufficient for effective conservation. The “enclave” theory: that
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conservation goals can be achieved by the separation of resources to be preserved and
resources to be harnessed for economic gain has failed in achieving meaningful
biodiversity protection because biodiversity must be protected where it is found. This is
often on or in economically viable resources (Sax 2001). The ESA as written fails to
account for social and economic considerations when enforcing protections for
endangered species and has thus sparked controversies that can delay and potentially
harm endangered species further (Echeverria 2001).
A modern means of attending to the reconciliation of human economic and social
systems with the needs of biodiversity is through the implementation of collaborative
processes (Freeman 2010). Bringing the representatives of all the various interests
(including those of species) to one table to develop comprehensive, politically legitimate,
and ecologically viable solutions is problem solving that in theory better represents the
true impact of human systems on ecological systems and vice versa (Freeman 2010,
Burger 2011). Collaboration and stakeholder engagement increases effectiveness of the
negotiated result, develops institutions that bridge public and private interests as well as
jurisdictional boundaries, and brings parties not formerly involved in ecological
management into a stewardship role (Burger 2011, Ostrom 1990, Gerlak 2008, Freeman
2010). Partners in collaboration are able to engage in a broader role than previously
occupied and engage in a process of relationship building and group learning that
increases the group’s ability to effectively manage the resource in question (Pahl-Wostl
2007).
Other equally important motivations for the same “new age” management
activities in ESA implementation address what the Clinton Department of the Interior
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perceived as the politically unachievable goals of the ESA as written (Doremus 2001).
Attacks on the ESA in congress and focused resistance from the regulated community
prompted Clinton’s Secretary of Interior to envision collaborative methods as a way of
making the ESA more flexible (Echeverria 2001). This has allowed consideration of
important economic factors. However, problems with the model exist. Many
environmental constituencies have been critical of what they view as shifting emphasis
too heavily toward resource appropriators’ interests in scenarios where it seems obvious
that species are paying the higher price, that of likely extinction (Ibid). The true danger of
ESA repeal in congress or political risk that arises out of strict ESA enforcement is
potentially over-emphasized by implementing agencies that are predisposed to succumb
to focused political pressure (Doremus 2001). Collaboration and adaptive management
(as alternative to hard decisions) have been used effectively to delay substantive action
toward species recovery (Freeman 2010). The negotiated nature of collaborative
programs and lack of standardization and unclear legal requirements for adaptive
management have been seen to promote sluggish if not ineffective conservation activity
(Echeverria 2001, Nie and Schultz 2011, Ruhl and Fischman 2010).
4.2 Mobilization of Partner Investment in Institutional Supply
Parties in a collaborative process are faced with numerous obstacles including the
potential that all parties may benefit by the process though not all may fairly contribute
(Ostrom 1990). The concept of institutional supply and Ostrom’s questions for evaluating
a given organization’s potentials are employed to better understand the dynamics of the
MRGESCP.
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The ESA creates a crisis for the status quo operation of resource appropriators
whose activities or reliance on federal agency activities, jeopardize endangered species
(Freeman 2010). As the impetus for collaborative solutions to this crisis, ESA compliance
creates a superordinate goal for the parties involved. A superordinate goal is a goal,
shared by parties who may otherwise be adversaries but are allied because it can only be
achieved by the collective efforts of the parties and because without its achievement, all
parties would suffer (Sherif 1958 from Poitras et al. 2003). Because however, the
immediacy of the threat that the ESA imposes is diffused by the collaborative process, it
is possible for participants to engage in a manner that delays or stifles action. This can be
beneficial to the necessary process of coalition building if all parties will be burdened by
eventual failure of collaboration to the point that solutions are forced in the collaborative
forum. If, however, one or more of the parties is not sufficiently burdened by the
potential failure of collaboration and has sufficient time and financial resources to wait
out the collaborative process, then the process is jeopardized (Freeman 2010). If parties
are sufficiently compelled to participate in the process, they will do so with varying
levels of investment based on their interests, incentives or capabilities.
The development of collaborative institutions is functionally the development of
new public goods that benefit all parties to the collaboration regardless of their particular
contribution. For this reason, the same potential for “free riding” exists with regard to the
collaboratively developed institution as exists with the actual resource commons the
institution was developed to administer. This is known as a second-order collective
dilemma (Bates 1988, p 395 from Ostrom 1990). The ability of stakeholders to address
this dilemma is greatly influenced by the variables specific to their issue and organization
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(Ostrom 1990). Issues are numerous and these questions are used in the discussion to
evaluate the MRGESCP.
How many participants were involved?
What was their internal group structure?
Who initiated action?
Who paid the costs of entrepreneurial activities?
What kind of information did participants have about their situations?
What were the risks and exposures of various participants?
What broader institutions did participants use in establishing new rules?
Answering these questions allows analysis of obstacles, both internal and external
and discount rates associated with individual stakeholders’ position. Discount rate was a
relevant factor in relationships within the MRGESCP. Three factors of discount rate are
applicable. (1) Humans commonly emphasize potential losses over potential gains and (2)
immediate results (especially costs over gains) over extended results. This may influence
the level to which individuals discount certain potential benefits to collaboration. (3)
Individuals with direct and exclusive dependence on a CPR or collaborative institution,
especially those subject to norms and customs of a resource dependent community will
place higher value on its management (Ibid.). This last element is the one most applicable
to the Program and is used to analyze statements in Chapter 6.5.
An incremental approach to institutional change is necessary (Ibid.).
Conceptualizing the “origins” of new institutions in a context of “changes” to old
institutions allows partners the perception of lower cost for provision of institutions. For
instance, if partners working within an existing framework can loosen constraints to
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make small alterations that more effectively combat the problems they face, they may be
able to achieve a small collaborative success. They can then increasingly invest over time
as they can test and benefit from aspects of incremental reforms. This may relieve the
expectation of the high cost of completely scrapping or reforming an existing institution
that may seem a more secure path that something totally new (Ibid.). Small, good faith
investments can succeed in establishing grounds for future trust and cooperation even in
light of game and other theories that predict incentive to develop wholly on the prospect
of prolonged engagement, coercion, or sanction. This is because they are a form of
communication, a soft behavior that enables reciprocity among players (Ostrom 1990,
Axelrod 1984, Bates 1988). It is more likely that this mode of investment will result in
long-term benefit for all parties proceeding in this fashion. Stronger relationships will be
formed and potential for social learning and substantive advances in management
effectiveness will be more likely to develop (Fisher and Brown 1988).
In negotiations, being able to invent options for mutual gains can allow either side
in a contentious arrangement to see more latitude for improving their situation beyond
just the options that initially or traditionally occur to the parties involved (Fisher and Ury
1981). It is advantageous for parties to “expand the pie” and realize the creation of an
other-than-zero sum game. The operation of expanding the pie is dynamic and influenced
heavily by those involved and their ability to make a process of the operation.
Prematurely critical tendencies among parties can diminish the diversity of potential
options. The conception that a single answer to a given problem or set of problems exists
also limits the creativity allowed in envisioning a more progressive and mutually gainful
set of options. In addition it is common for members of a party to assume that they are
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negotiating a fixed sum and thus preclude any creative expansion of options available.
Finally, the tendency exists for parties to remain adversarial in the envisioning of options
for a more holistically gainful program. In this sense, individuals may create barriers to
effective incentive building by assuming that they have no responsibility for
understanding the needs of the other side and thus short-change themselves and the
process as a whole when it comes to securing cooperative agreement by process of
incentive building (Ibid.).
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Figure 2: Incentive Building
Negotiation

A group’s ability to undertake the
incentive-options building process
can be evaluated graphically by
comparing dynamics to a circle
chart that illustrates what Fisher
and Ury view as the necessary 4
modes of thinking to develop a
sufficiently diverse array of
options.(Adapted from Fisher and
Ury 1981)
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The quality of collaboration can thus benefit from (1) a group’s ability to make an
intentional process of the operation by separating inventing from actual decision-making
regarding options, (2) assuming that “room” must be developed in the number of options
available for negotiation and (3) realizing that the end product likely contains more
options than parties came to the table believing existed. Finally, if all sides of a
negotiation are able to place themselves in each other’s shoes, the conception that each
party’s self-interest is best served by taking responsibility for a properly negotiated
agreement can focus incentive building. This contrasts with a situation where parties
adhere to the status quo and expect the other side to solve its own problems (Ibid.).
In the development of collaborative processes, it is likely that most parties will
perceive some benefit to participating in consensus building. This can be enough to
motivate participation or can be a step in pulling parties to the table when a lack of trust
or history of confrontation is present. Poitras et al. (2003) argue that the “appeal of
collaboration” was an intermediate variable between interactions in which collaboration
seemed impossible for reasons of mistrust and interactions that were more straightforward. They identify that mistrust can create a “reactive devaluation” of the benefits of
collaboration and that simultaneously benefits can be used to incentivize the process of
conflict analysis that can lead to collaboration. In this model the benefits of collaboration
are related to the concept of the superordinate goal (Poitras et al. 2003).
Because the specific scenarios of focus in this study are driven by the potential for
exogenous sanction, development of cooperative relationships will depend on the length
of time partners collaborate. Freeman (2010) points to necessary periods of “regulatory
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cruising”, or “stretching” the regulatory system to delay investment, as necessary to
coalition building within various scales in the collaborative venture. He finds that midlevel organizations, not directly subject to state or federal control and not directly
influenced by individual interests, are vehicles to systems of exchange that enable the
buy-in of constituencies that will benefit from not collaborating and would not be
burdened by the failure of collaboration. His contention is that the command and control
administration of the ESA could not achieve this. In the end it is the ability to manage the
crisis imposed by the ESA that results in functional collaboration. “Cruising” is limited
when financial resources and time are limited and when sufficient hardship is inevitable
if collaboration fails. Thus limiting factors in addition to sufficient time for coalition
building while all parties are under the threat of sanction enables crisis management and
eventually, investment (Freeman 2010).
4.3 Collaboration and Regulation: The Problems of Law, Regulatory Culture and
History
The above description focuses on the dynamics of stakeholders in collaboration to
meet satisfactory resolutions to conflict through collective action to alter governance
institutions. It does not touch upon the complex backdrop of regulatory structure, culture
and history that influences collaborative river governance institutions. The state of the
modern move toward the use of collaboration in ecosystem governance is precariously
balanced. Serious questions exist as to the complexity and legality of collaboration. It is
unclear whether the tradition and culture of rule based law can or should make way for
collaboration and uncertain how much the culture produced by the history of water law
serves to hinder it.
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Issues of scale and regulatory or scientific capacity in ecosystems and their
governance agencies seem to require that governance bodies be designed in ways that test
the limits of regulation (Karkainnen 2002). Ecosystem and similarly, watershed
boundaries seldom abide political boundaries and are thus subject to multi-scalar, multijurisdictional management (Karkainnen 2002, Gillon 2002). Knowledge and ability to
gather information about various system functions, ability to access funding sources and
operational abilities will vary greatly from the scale of landowner, to local government,
to state and federal levels. Hybrid institutions, “which involve horizontal coordination
among multiple and (at least nominally equal) ‘sister’ governments” and vertical
coordination across multiple tiers of government from local to federal can integrate
capabilities regarding information resolution, funding sources, knowledge and skills to
successfully manage complex multi-jurisdictional systems (Karkainnen 2002 pp.13).
“The collaborative ecosystem governance model explicitly recognizes the need for
integrated, holistic management of ecosystems as systems, and grapples with questions of
scale and complexity in ecosystem management, emphasizing locally or regionally
tailored solutions within broader structures of coordination and public accountability”
(Karkainnen 2002 pp. 3).
But prudence, fairness and sheer complexity simultaneously caution heavily
against abandoning strict rule of law regulation for the ambiguity of the collaborative
forum (Sousa & McGrory Klyza 2007). As outlined in Chapter 3, challenges to
watershed management include clean water and air, endangered species, irrigated
agriculture and land use management at the federal and state level. Each western state has
similar yet diverse allocation laws for surface water, ground water, and management of
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wildlife. Each phenomenon is administered by different agencies at federal, state and
tribal levels (Gillon 2002). Sharing of power in collaboration is complex and not easy to
accomplish (Karkainnen 2002).
This complex regulatory patchwork historically attempted to apply highly
prescriptive remedies in a command and control fashion to the problems of complex and
largely unique ecosystem circumstances at all scales as if scale were irrelevant
(Karkainnen 2008). The resulting practical failures have led some to believe that
alteration to this regulatory system is inevitable. Karkainnen (2008) invokes what Sable
and Simon referred to in public law as the use of “destabilization rights.” Destabilization
in the public law context refers to the courts’ use of constitutional or statutory violation to
“pull the plug on” or destabilize an offending institution while remanding its solution to
the state to resolve, often in collaboration with the original plaintiffs, while retaining
jurisdiction for future adjustments. In this way, courts have taken lessons from the civil
rights era in which forced structural prescriptions developed by judges fell short of
suitable remedies for a given problem. While a solution is then mandated, the designers
of the solution are those with expertise to solve the problem. Transferred to
environmental management, the implication is that the current command and control
regulatory institution is ossified and ineffective. Karkainnen broadens the use of the
model to include “destabilization events” in ecosystem governance such as citizen suits
brought under the ESA or “anthropo-natural” crises such as climate change induced
droughts that might force more creative solutions than those available under the “rule of
law” model.
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Collaborative attempts at resolving the mismatch between the substantive
problem and the prescriptive solution face the dilemma of how to produce accountability
without a rigid and formulaic set of rules. Some view them to be the “ultimate policy
without law—the making of an entirely new approach to regulation and natural resources
policy without statutory guidance” (Sousa & McGrory Klyzer 2007 pp.3). The dilemma
exists in that despite the apparent devaluation of the law, the solutions law has provided
and scope of the regulatory structure are insufficient. For instance, in the proceedings of
regulatory negotiations (reg-negs), where the regulatory structure is negotiated between
the regulator and regulated stakeholders, the negotiating committee is authorized only a
specific scope of authority from which to attend the deliberation. However, “only in the
process of deliberation is the appropriate scope of a problem likely to emerge…the
moment when scope issues arise in negotiations is likely also to be the moment the key
difficulty with the statute, existing regulation or initial conception of the problem
becomes clear” (Freeman 1997 pp. 25). Without re-conceiving the committee’s
negotiating authority, or in the broader sense of environmental law, a statute’s authority,
a proper solution may not be found. Often, this reduces the scope of available reforms,
especially in that most bargaining taking place in these scenarios is viewed in terms of
potential issues to be traded or compromised. This creation of a zero-sum approach
reduces the options for problem solving and makes full disclosure dangerous to parties
involved (Ibid.).
However frustrating this can be to the process of solving problems best suited to
collaborative solutions, the constraints that exist do so for good reason. Environmental
laws of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s were constructed in a rigid, prescriptive manner

35

in response to “interest group liberalism” that evolved out of the New Deal Era. Interest
representation functionally contributed to prevalence of industry capture of regulatory
policy “erasing the distinction between public authority and private interests allowing
private interests to use public power to achieve their own purposes” (Lowi from Sousa &
McGrory Klyzer 2007 pp.3).
Because of its similarity to interest group liberalism, environmental organizations
strongly oppose collaborative processes in many scenarios where there is likelihood that
they may weaken existing regulation in favor of industrial interests who are often
perceived as approaching the collaborative process with a sense of entitlement (Freeman
1997). Environmental organizations repeatedly feel that the interests at the table are
strongly weighted in favor of parochial economic interests in processes that involve
agencies “horse trading” with regulated partners while skirting formal evaluation
processes (Echeverria 2001).
The decades of “rule based litigation” that came out of 1970’s environmental law
produced a rule-based and rule-bound regulatory model (Karkainnen 2002(2)). “It seeks
to solve environmental problems (and just as importantly, to retain a critical disciplining
role for public interest lawyers) by imposing and enforcing, in a top down fashion, tough
binding rules aimed principally at the largest and most visible categories of corporate
targets and secondarily, federal agencies” (Karkainnen 2002(2)pp.2). The culture of
entrepreneurial litigators who helped shape this model are integral in retaining it. Despite
the potential that it hinders more comprehensive solutions to real world problems, the
ENGOs whose ranks are comprised of many of these same litigators are chronically
deficient in resources and facing industrial interests with greater incentive to collaborate
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and comparatively limitless resources. They remain far more committed to retaining the
“rule of law” model (Karkainnen 2002(2), Freeman 1987).
Finally, a similarly embedded friction in the legacy of western water law exists
between state and federal governments and the heterogeneous water appropriators they
serve. The problem is historical and summarized by Getches (2001): when western water
resources were public domain, the federal government had no resources to develop or
enforce their use. Settlers were encouraged to take and use water they found there for
mining, agriculture and domestic uses. National policy favored development and water
was an instrument of that policy. If settlers in new states and territories could avoid or
resolve water conflicts themselves, the federal government was pleased to defer. The
Supreme Court ultimately held it was the states prerogative to allocate water on public
lands by any system they chose. Western states relied on decisions recognizing their
freedom to choose an allocation system to apply within their boundaries to support an
“expectation of exclusive and perpetual state control over water resources” (DuMars and
Tarlock 1989 from Getches 2001). The seminal United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation
Company however, made clear that state-authorized water use must not interfere with
federal rights to protect flow of the stream and can be superseded by the exercise of
federal powers over commerce and public lands. “Almost every iteration of the policy of
deference was accompanied by citations to Rio Grande, which subordinated state control
to federal supremacy” (Getches 2001 pp.3). Many federal policies seem to give priority
to state supremacy, but all retain federal control.
Internal friction within states characterized the water development era. Although
publicly claiming state authority over water resources, development of public works was
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attractive for politicians who could deliver tangible results to their constituents. “The
primary water policy objective of western politicians in the twentieth century was aimed
at capturing federal assistance for water projects” (Getches 2001 pp.5). Competition for
these funds and politics of developing projects created incentive to subordinate state
water rights and conform state policies to comply with federal goals in order to
participate in federal dam building. At the end of the water development era states were
left outraged by combination of constraints imposed by 1970’s era environmental laws
and the abrupt collapse of federal water project policies in response to public
environmental sentiment and economic constraints. They felt their control of the future
had been undermined (Ibid.)
The tension between water appropriators and federal government in control of
water rights is epitomized by litigation concerning Section 402.03 of the ESA’s
implementing regulations which states that only discretionary agency actions on the part
of action agencies trigger Section 7 consultation (Drake 2001). The regulation itself has a
convoluted and controversial history (Hasselman 2006). Nonetheless, in the 2007
decision National Home Builders Association verses Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme
Court held that if an agency’s authorizing statute mandates that the agency “shall”
perform certain actions that would normally trigger Section 7, Section 7 does not apply
(Hasselman 2007). Seen initially as a victory for water users, it is argued that the decision
may have limited the scope of the regulation by specifying its qualification in such
narrow terms as mandatory (“shall”) and specifically statutory (Ibid.). Here, arguments
may be generated for easier findings of agency discretion and may limit the power of
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regulations or contracts in protecting water users from re-allocation of water for
endangered species uses (Hasselman 2007, Benson 2011).
While the complexity of ecosystem and watershed management seem to require
some sort of comprehensive collaborative approach to governance, this requirement is
met with a dilemma regarding the propriety of the “rule of law” regulatory system
(Karkainnen 2002, Sousa & McGrory Klyza 2007). The historical necessities of the “rule
of law” system and supporting culture of public interest litigators buttress a distrust
among environmentalists that serves to hinder investment of these parties in the
collaborative forum. The historical battle for states to assert control over water resources
against federal encroachment has developed a culture of resistance that, when pitted in
adversarial zero-sum negotiations, increases the limitations already threatening creative,
outside the box solutions (Getches 2001, Karkainnen 2002(2)). Environmental advocates
as well as resource appropriators have ample legal justification to retreat to what may
seem safer adversarial positions, yet the prescriptive legal solutions rarely satisfy
disputants real needs (Karkainnen 2002(2)).
It is relevant to point out some important factors about both the Federal regulation
and state allocation systems. There are some that view the system of western water
allocation as “steeped in archaic concepts fashioned to address situations no longer
relevant” (Cosens 2003 pp.1). Others see it as fair and sustaining to a culture and
economy that has helped the west to thrive (Willardson 2011). Most importantly, water
development is likely the single most significant threat to species (Loso et al 1995 from
Getches 2001). Because of federal regulations, it is also a threat to human water use
itself. Specifically regarding the ESA and western water law, both regulatory frameworks
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provide nearly absolute protection for one interest, neither seeks to balance economic and
environmental interests, both protect the status quo better than they provide for the future
and both are already more restrictive on paper than in practice (Benson 2004). While
collaboration is riddled with difficulty, it is currently tested as a third option, stretching
the limits of regulation and comfort, and currently serves as the best concept for resolving
the impasse between environmental and allocation regulatory systems. (Adler 2008,
Karkainnen 2002(2), Sousa & McGrory Klyza 2007)
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5. Research Design and Methodology
To understand what factors become mobilizing incentives for investment in
collaborative ESA implementation on the MRG, it was necessary to understand the
interests, relationships and pressures of the various partners. Interests illuminated the
level to which a partner finds itself threatened by the ESA or possible compromise with
the federal government or other partners (Doremus 2006 from Scott et al. 2006).
Relationships attest to a level of trust present within the program or how trust and
coalition building have been fostered (Bates 1988, Freeman 2010). The term
“relationship” can also describe structural elements such as political or some other
advantage, need for coverage and resources available. In combination with interests and
relationships, pressures perceived by the various partners can show potential for “crisis”
management, time limits on “cruising” and necessity of investment (Freeman 2010,
Ostrom 1990).
Data regarding interests was primarily gathered though a series of semi-structured
interviews. This was aided by observation of Program meetings and document analysis.
Understanding of partner relationships was dominantly gathered within the interview
process as well, but was also effectively supplemented by observation of group dynamics
in meetings. Pressures were illuminated by all three types of data collection: interview,
observation and document analysis methods. Document analysis was used to more
directly understand incentives such as financial, infrastructural and ESA compliance
related incentives of participation. Documents were originally reviewed as a framework
for general understanding of the Program and to develop interview questions. Documents
were also reviewed to flag relevant sections for coding and analysis. This was then honed
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after the interview process in which participants identified the importance of various
documents.
In all, thirteen interviews were conducted with representatives of stakeholder
organizations of the MRGESCP. Because of their positions’ importance in literature,
some parties not officially members of the collaborative program were also interviewed.
Interviews were limited to members of the sixteen stakeholder organizations or peripheral
organizations that were either directly influential in the decision making process or
potentially influenced the process through other-than-collaborative methods. Some
important, higher ranking representative voices are not included in this work through
failure of one kind or another to schedule their interviews. Often this was attributed to
busy schedules, but may also have resulted from an interest in not being interviewed.
The analytical framework for evaluating incentives for investment mobilization
divided incentives into two categories: those that can be described as investment
mobilizing and those that can be described as investment hindering. Incentives that
mobilize investment were seen as those that contributed to proactive collaborative
development of effective institutions for accomplishing ESA goals and the protection of
social and economic viability simultaneously. Investment hindering incentives are
incentives to prolong delay of action, participate with minimal investment in (free-ride),
or attempt to scuttle collaboration or specific program elements that threaten a particular
party’s interests. The rationale for specific words is found in Freeman (2010) as the word
“mobilize” is consistently used to describe the process of investment and “hinder” is a
near-antonym.
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Figure 3: Analytic Framework
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To develop the analytical framework further, these two categories of incentives
were divided into incentives based in interest, cooperative relationship building and
pressure. The analytical framework informed the questions asked during semi-structured
interviews. These questions were asked in person and responses recorded or hand written.
These questions are listed in Appendix A and followed by an outline of the analytic
framework, each component of which is linked in the appendix to the appropriate
question.
The analytical framework was used to develop the final codebook used for
analysis in the qualitative research software. Upon interaction with empirical data, it was
necessary to condense analytical categories in the final codebook based on their presence,
absence, or duplication. The final analytic codes in the codebook used were also
condensed based on the need to use them only in identification of a relationship. For
example, incentives related to relationships would simply be coded: RELationship. This
is because in coding text, it is important to avoid specificity (good verses bad
relationship) but simply use the relationship to refer to the specific piece of text. This is
because the narrative description to be generated is in the text itself and is qualitative in
nature. Further details of how the analytical framework and code book were used are
described in the data analysis process that follows.
Analysis of data was conducted using multiple methods. Qualitative research
software Atlas TI v.6. was used to understand relationships between codes derived from
the analytic categories laid out above and logistical and subject-position categories that
are detailed in the final code book in Appendix A.
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The Atlas analysis process involves the development of three categories of codes:
Subject-position, Logistical and Analytical. Subject Position codes designate the actor or
person speaking such as an interview respondent according to their affiliation or position
from which they are answering. An example subject position for this research would be
“Non-Federal Actor”. Others are “Federal Action Agency” and “Strong Need for (ESA)
Coverage.” Subject position codes combined to describe a specific stakeholder based on
identity and structural factors.
Logistical Codes identify the source of the text or dialogue being analyzed based
on its origin in the data collection process. This could mean that it tells the analyst
whether the information was taken from field notes or a reflection journal, observation or
interview data or whether the conversation took place in an official or informal setting
such as in a meeting or over dinner.
Finally, Analytical Codes are based on the researcher’s criteria for analysis. For
purposes of this research, these were the categories outlined above (mobilizing versus
hindering: interest, relationship and pressure categories for each). These analytical
themes were amended as necessary since part of the preliminary process of applying
these codes is that understanding the empirical situation being researched is altered by
their application. This is simply a function of education that a researcher undergoes while
attempting to understand the phenomenon of concern. The coding process can be iterative
and may involve the re-organization or complete re-creation of the coding system, as
more is understood (Isaac pers com 2012).
Codes were then applied to the data (such as program documents, interview
transcriptions or observation notes) so that text was comprehensively coded under the
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researchers system. From these coded texts, relationships were developed for codes and
their intersection with others. Theories were developed to describe the relationships
illustrated by these intersections and the researcher’s new understanding was applied to
further development of the coding framework and theories regarding the phenomenon in
question. This was achieved using an analysis matrix in which subject positions were
compared to analytic themes and narratives developed based on the intersection of these
themes and positions.
Simultaneous to the Atlas process, an analysis notebook was created in which a
section was devoted to each agency or entity interviewed, the Program as a whole, and
the various themes being evaluated: exchanges/options developed, goals of the Program,
burden of compliance, trust relationships, cost, adaptive management and scientific
controversy and the transition to the RIP. During the coding process, specific narratives
encountered in each interview, observation or document analysis was noted in the
pertinent section. In the case of sections regarding specific stakeholders, one half was
devoted to statements made by the stakeholder regarding themselves and the other half to
statements made about the stakeholder by other individuals. In this way, an organized
narrative, based on empirical data was developed for each stakeholder or theme. Each
was summarized and developed into the final results and discussion section.
Since rigor in qualitative research is of the utmost importance, two journals were
kept to affectively demonstrate current efforts and ideas as the project progressed (Isaac
pers com 2012). This ensured a “paper trail” that chronicles the history of the project as it
evolved. One journal was for collecting field data. The other journal was for informal
reflection, ideas and recording advisory meetings with committee members. Journals,
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voice data and transcriptions were available to advisory faculty for verification, and upon
completion of the research were destroyed per confidentiality protocols.
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6. Results

Figure 4: Analytic Themes in
Approximate Empirical Interaction

Post-analysis understanding of
the Analytic Themes suggests that
many (at least presently) fall on
the side of Investment Hindering
Incentive. Mobilizing components
affect all interactions but do not
dominate participants’
sentiments toward the Program
as a whole reflected in the
dominance of Hindering
Incentives (negatively stated) in
the Program category.
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Risk and incentive play a convoluted role in the dynamics of the MRGESCP. For
simplicity’s sake risk and incentive are collectively referred to as “incentives” which are
either mobilizing or hindering. It is important to note that it is an exogenous force, the
ESA that originally compels all parties to the table and how this shaped and shapes
interaction. The dynamic created by this fact is one of defensive positioning in which all
parties can basically be divided into two camps within a legally compelled collaboration.
There are those attempting primarily to preserve a social or economic good and those
attempting primarily to preserve an environmental good. Social and environmental
incentives then, end up reflecting this division and both are collectively preservative.
These three categories make up Interest based incentives which go to influence the
relationships present in the Program.
On one side of the relationship-based incentives that influence the program are
collaboration-based incentives that at various times in the Program’s history and,
participants hope, in its future have contributed to investment in institutional supply. On
the other side are incentives related to the Program’s structural realities that participants
generally described as problematic and that diminish the value of the collaboration-based
incentives. These Program-related incentives are negatively influenced by a three-way
reinforcing relationship between structural elements comprised of power, advantage, and
cost related incentives. Each of these categories was originally assigned to relationshipbased, interest- based and pressure-based respectively in the Analytic Framework. The
relationship between these three is seen to negatively affect trust which in turn influences
Program related incentives. Simultaneously, the relationship influences financial and
legal coverage under the Program and dictates the level of pressure imposed on
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participants to effectively attend to the goals of the Program. Coverage and pressure
could be affected by incentives to produce mutually gainful options (incentive building)
and mobilize investment. These incentive building exercises are reportedly rare. The
conglomerate interaction of hindering influences appears to stifle investment in the sense
that investment changes the status quo. This reinforces some participants’ assertion that
the overriding factor influencing the Program is coverage. It complicates the development
of pro-active, problem solving institutions and likely reinforces the status-quo as benefits
more powerful interests at the table.
Subject position codes developed in Chapter 5 are used to identify quotations
throughout Chapter 6. In section 6.5 they are used in combination to more specifically
define stakeholders’ subject positions and compare and categorize their statements.
Subject positions from Chapter 5 include: FRA Federal Regulatory/Action Agency, NFA
Non-Federal Actor, SNC Strong Need for Coverage, WNC Weak Need for Coverage,
EXST – Has some exogenous/internal structural advantage, RESources- Has resources,
either water, land, monetary, DUPlicative- Disadvantageous or secondary (less
influential) dual representative. Only FRA and NFA are used to identify quotations.

6.1 Interest Based Incentives
Interest based incentives characterized stakeholders based on their primary
missions as entities and how those factors drew each to the collaborative process. In
actuality, these incentives are preservative incentives that initially divide participants into
two camps based on environmental or social interest.
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6.1.1 Environmental Concern Based Incentives
ENV

Entities with a primary concern of protection of species tended to find the
Collaborative Program to lack proper incentives for their participation or to be muddled
in ineffective activity:
“If you asked anyone, what are the institutions that (A) exist to benefit the river or
(B) that implement policies that provide secure water for the river, the answer
would be they don’t exist.” NFA
“The Collaborative Program is a vehicle of the status quo” NFA
“We don’t have the resources. They (agents of the status-quo) have all the
resources in the world.” NFA
“They can meet forever and ever and ever and this gets back to one of the
problems of collaboration in this context, in this sort of setting is, our enemy is
time. Their ally is time.” NFA
“They would basically like to use the RIP to protect their water uses, current
water uses and contribute a little bit to recovery but they lack this commitment,
that our goal is to recover endangered species, that’s not their goal and its quite
obvious its not” FRA
“My personal disenchantment, when I realized that this was never going to be
truly collaborative, that this was going to be, you know some kind of old school
bureaucratic hybrid was when Domenici’s aid said well the senator can’t just
keep, well this is just not sustainable to have this funding come through as a
congressional add every year, we want to get a charter for the program and we
can’t just have these discussion groups, we’ve got to have only the top dogs that
can make the decisions making the decisions” NFA
The structure of the program is seen to be heavily weighted in favor of interests
with power and resources. These interests, as illustrated in Chapter 4.3 tended not to
favor environmental causes, but economic. Entities with other primary stated
motivations, stated environmental incentives as secondary and in defense of their
operations:
“Generally bringing the SJCP water down to where its taken out is overall very
favorable for the species” NFA
“Half of the water withdrawn at the diversion is returned back at the reclamation
plant, that is really the only effect” NFA
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“So I think in collaboration we can all help each other and we can provide the
protection to the silvery minnow and we can protect our interest also.” NFA
“(MRGCD water) does get to the fish…so one of the ironies that I think that
MRGCD sees is that a lot of that return flow water, its going to go back to the
river but its sort of a willy nilly.” NFA
One participant described a dynamic based on the scope of the ESA that limits its
ability to attend to the problems that altered the river in the first place such as the
building of large scale flood control and impoundment features that permanently altered
river geomorphology. Since the building of these structures is seen by the ESA as action
which no longer involves federal agencies, it cannot force alteration of the activities (i.e.
structure removal/alteration). The functional scope of the ESA is then limited to water
management. Since much of water management can be claimed to be beneficial to
species, partner representatives can claim that they have only limited responsibility while
continuing to manage water under their regular operations. The above comments also
allude to a lack of understanding of how species needs may interplay with water
infrastructure and return flow dynamics.
6.1.2 Social System Related Incentives
SOC

Those entities primarily concerned with provision of water for human uses cited
numerous social incentives including economics, obligatory duties to water users,
heritage and tradition:
“Yes, yes it could affect farmers businesses you know depending on how it is
being implemented in the future, like so far we have been able to survive and we
are still doing our business, but people have to change their way of providing their
businesses providing the resources they need” NFA
“I think that a we have responsibilities that we need to continue to do so a, for
example our obligations (to constituents)” NFA
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“The water rights in the MRG are some of the oldest in the state of New Mexico.
They are older than almost anything in Northern New Mexico with the exception
of some of the ones around Espanola and up around the Chama.” NFA
“There are friends of mine that have water rights that date to 1796 and earlier. So
there is documented evidence of diversion irrigation in the middle valley in my
area, dating back 5000 years.” NFA
The pueblos and pre-puebloan peoples were indeed diverting river water for
agriculture long before anyone else was here. And you know when the
conquistadors came through and they stood on the hill by ABQ, they estimate
25,000 acres under irrigation when they arrived.” NFA
“…uncompensated takings and having the people that own the water rights get
their water moved around without any idea what the heck was going on? Getting
blessed with Klamath?” NFA
There are multiple facets to the interactions between stakeholders with primarily
social or economic goals. Some of these entities are more or less influential than others.
Some are municipal agencies while others are organizations that represent a specific
cultural group such as irrigators or tribes. While each agency has a constituency, it can be
said that some groups, especially those that have a more representational than resource
management related goal, feel more connected to tradition than others. In some cases, a
conflict dynamic is established when a more representational and a more resource
management oriented entity both represent the same constituency or resource. Conflicts
or alliances can arise.
There is also an ongoing cultural shift in the MRG between the agricultural and urban
way of life (Shively 2001). Individuals on either side of this divide can also find conflict
and also have different levels of value they place on heritage and tradition.

6.1.3 Other Preservative Incentives
PRE

Other preservative incentives included protection of autonomy, interests, legal
exposure, and financial resources:
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“And a, if we don’t work collaboratively there’s a chance that somebody else may
get into your field and may impact on you indirectly.”NFA
“I think everyone has an interest in protecting their interest, and everyone also has
interest in complying with the law. So those are two of the couple of things that
keeps people together, if you can work collaboratively and each protect our own
interests I think you have succeeded in some way.”NFA
“But I think there’s a lot of resistance to moving forward and having some belief
that some of the things were doing could do some good, there seems to be so
much reluctance to actually do anything until we know its going to do good, so its
more internal to the collaborative program that’s been the problem I think.”NFA
These kinds of preservative interests are less based on the specific social or
environmental goals and have more to do with protection of finances, legal exposure
or the ability of a given entity to maintain authority over its particularly area of
responsibility without having to be dictated to by outside entities.
6.2 Relationship Based Incentives
6.2.1 Collaborative and Program Based Incentives
COL

Collaboration, as a theoretical tool, was looked upon favorably by many
participants. Where it was seen by some as “contextually ineffective,” the theory at least,
was seen to have merits, if stated skeptically:
“Collaboration is the elixir of the status-quo…theories and collaboration all sound
fine.” NFA

Most participants found there to be some distance between collaboration in theory
and in practice. By those who found it to be the best (or only non-litigious) option,
collaboration was viewed as a tool for possible social learning, as a means of getting
parties involved in decision-making and negotiation, and one that could improve
efficiency of ESA implementation by streamlining agencies interactions and including
non-federal actors in Section 7 consultation:
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“One thing I noticed with the collaboration are with the number of agencies
getting involved we are getting expertise from different areas and when you get
expertise you get new ideas, and that may be some silver lining for everybody.”
NFA
Well that’s why we’re going to engage in collaboration, that’s why we’re going to
argue about it, it may be good for you it may not be good for us, so you know we
have to find some other solution to that, I think we are looking at consensus based
solutions to the problems, and if we feel that this is really going to adversely
affect us we’re going to stand up and say hey this is not the way it should work.
NFA
“…it’s the best we’ve got…the collaboration isn’t going well it has a lot of
structural problems….there is a long way we have to go…but we’re not going to
make progress any other way FRA
“Our involvement more directly fit with working within the collaborative program
because we have broad powers to obtain funds from the legislature.” NFA
“Reclamation and ISC put money into maintaining the pilot channel down into
Elephant Butte, to make sure that there’s water that can be delivered to Elephant
Butte. So all of those things sort of made it so that, there is a nexus with the, both
the federal agencies”
“There is a mechanism by which non-fed entities can get federal coverage. You
know the whole Section Ten piece, but the thought was that the non-fed folks
would, through the nexus of the Collaborative Program would maybe achieve
better synergy with the federal agencies umm, and go through the section seven
process, which is kind of the federal process.”

A number of factors go into making collaboration helpful. These factors, such as
working relationships increase the ability of the program to transcend trust and other
barriers to effective partnerships:
“Certainly its easier to have hostility towards someone you don’t know
personally, so collaboration always helps in that sense.” FRA
“I spend more time with those people in the agencies and have known Jane Doe
and the others over there for years. So we have a good working relationship. My
management… have some different interpretations.” NFA
PRO

Where collaboration was seen as a positive theoretical framework, individuals
were still prone to see it as insufficiently effective. This is largely because of the
structural components of the Program that act as counterweight to productive
collaboration. As mentioned above, Program related incentives were strongly affected by
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trust and pressure dynamics, both strongly influenced by a feedback of hindering
incentives comprised of power-, advantage- and cost-based incentives.
As structural components of the Program that act as negative incentive these
factors manifest as:
Foundational problems with how parties were initially compelled to the table in a
“command and control fashion” that resulted in adversarial behavior
Lack of unifying Program objectives,
Disparity of individual partner stake in the Program
Funding Problems
Natural, Regulatory and Programmatic Uncertainty
Foundational Problems with the Program:

“…got to the point through the lawsuits where the BOR, FWS and Corps, the
three fed entities and the district and the ISC, the two principle non-fed entities
came to the conclusion that somehow we could enter this collaborative program.
Senator Domenici was very instrumental, basically I think he ordered us all into
it.” NFA
“Well the main drivers of course are the federal agencies, you know it’s a federal
law that we are trying to comply with.” NFA
“…enter the collaborative program, because clearly that wasn’t the way to
manage a species. So in order to avoid some of these heinous things, there was
legislation drafted.” NFA
Two important factors that arise out of these statements are (1) that the problem itself
(endangered species) was not something that participants would have necessarily known
of or faced if not for the federal statute. This is significant because, as Ostrom (2009)
points out, much of what can be achieved in collaboration is due to the fact that all parties
are faced with tangible consequences if some alleviating action is not taken. In cases she
describes, the consequences are physical and based on a commonly used resource such as
groundwater which, if not for some rethinking of the extraction regime will run out. In
the case that sanction under the ESA is the consequence, it may be that a controversial
law, opposed in many places at the state and local levels is either ineffective at producing
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dire circumstances or is more easily diffused through political activity than is feasible to
force collective action. It may be that biodiversity loss itself is not as easily internalized
as loss of a commodity such as groundwater. (2) Both by the ESA and congressional
intervention, important structural elements of the Program are in essence pre-fabricated
installations. The ESA, as described above, installed the problem/crisis at the regional
level. This means that the problem itself could be seen to be invented in the eyes of those
who do not have a direct interest in biodiversity.
Senator Domenici’s protective interventions then dictated certain important structural
rules for the game and initiated “collaboration” which, at that point in history was an
established means of dealing with similar scenarios. What is important about prefabricated installations here is that they are based on theories derived from the study of
processes that developed organically in other situations. In Ostrom’s groundwater
example, several adjacent groundwater basins were able to develop institutions that
effectively recreated their extraction regimes in sustainable and cooperative ways. Their
success prompted officials to export their functioning institutional framework to another
basin nearly a hundred miles away which was suffering from similar problems to the ones
faced by the original basins. In the second case, the cooperative framework failed
resoundingly. The major factor of relevance to its failure one place and success in another
is the lack of organic, collaborative development of institutions in the failed basin. The
failed basin was being managed with an imported system that might have been
structurally sound, but was not a product of the social and political situations at hand in
that basin. There was simply a lack of investment. Similar problems may be present in
the MRG.
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Lack of Unifying Objective

Two consistent themes in the interview process seemed to fall hand in hand. First
was the absence of a unifying goal, and second, the means by which to unify parties
around multiple necessary goals. Often this was stated in terms of a want for leadership,
be it a third party or FWS in the form of solid guidelines for compliance.
“Incentives, strong leadership, clear vision, if I don’t have those elements, and by
clear vision I mean someone who is ready to implement it, institutional
mechanisms to allow for the implementation, political will … you look at the
table…you look at the players at the table, are they people who you think of as
creative collaborative types when push comes to shove…
“The intent of Program participants is two-fold: first, to prevent extinction,
preserve reproductive integrity, improve habitat, support scientific analysis, and
promote recovery of the listed species within the Program area in a manner that
benefits the ecological integrity, where feasible, of the Middle Rio Grande
riverine and riparian ecosystem; and, second, to exercise creative and flexible
options so that existing water uses continue and future water development
proceeds in compliance with applicable federal and state laws. To achieve these
ends, the Program may not impair state water rights or federal reserved water
rights of individuals and entities; federal or other water rights of Indian nations
and Indian individuals, or Indian trust assets; San Juan-Chama Project contractual
rights; and the State of New Mexico’s ability to comply with Rio Grande
Compact delivery obligations.” Bi-Laws (MRGESCP 2009)
“The goals are clear enough, but they are conflicting goals. They are goals that by
their very nature are going to conflict, which and, that introduces the problem in a
collaborative program because you’ve got three different goals that are in conflict
with each other and you’ve got all these different entities that, each and every one
of those entities probably has one of those goals in mind.” NFA
“There is not this commitment by entering the program to address this one stated
goal. You’ve got the water users come in, they’re goal is to protect existing and
future uses, and you’ve got the Service and a few other entities in there, “our goal
is to recover the species” okay we are both speaking a different language and
there’s a little overlap, I mean, there’s two circles and they’re kind of you know
kind of coming a little bit together but they’re not fully overlapped by any
means.” NFA
“The collaborative program could be a wonderful success if everyone was
working toward the same goal and trusted each other.” NFA
“(Okay so that’s kind of like having a very specific goal) yes very much so,
otherwise you spend each year trying to comply with the BO and that’s a good
thing to do but for 17 or 18 signatories its very hard to do.” NFA
“ If there is not a clear vision of what is trying to be accomplished and strong
leadership to get there that’s different from the status quo, then the forces who are
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most resistant to change and most in favor of maintaining the status quo will
prevail.” NFA
“ Nobody agrees on what’s to be done?” NFA
“So far, so much of what has happened in the Collaborative Program is fighting
over science. How much water does the fish need and how do you count fish.
Those are the two questions they seem to fight about the most and when you are
fighting over those questions instead of pooling your resources and saying hey
lets figure this out, let pool our resources, lets get water over here, lets do this
change in the channel in the river and lets just start doing stuff, instead.” FRA
Disparity of individual partner stake in the Program

Disparity in Partner stake can be seen to manifest from two perspectives. First,
there are parties with a great deal of influence, who control resources and who have a
great deal of legal stake for the consequences of their actions. Arising from them are
concerns over what kind of entities (based on influence) should be allowed at the table.
While these entities represent a constituency, they are seen by some other entities as
improperly representing it. They are seen to be neglectful of interests with less influence
regardless of valid concerns they may bring.
These other parties tend to be less influential in the collaborative forum but may
have less ability to discount results that are unfavorable to them. This is true in the case
of irrigators whose livelihood depends on their water rights or ENGO’s whose main
mission may be compromised by collaborating in an unsympathetic forum.
There is also the phenomenon of shared responsibility in which coverage under the
ESA is provided by the Program, but coverage and cost are equalized where culpability
in detrimental activities may be highly differential from party to party.
“What has UNM got to lose? Or to Gain by participation in this program?...” NFA
“We talk about the big six or the big five. That’s kind of language that’s batted
around a lot in the meetings that we have, the Corps and the bureau and the FWS
and the District and the ISC and the Attorney General’s office. Kind of referred to
now as the big six. It was the big five and then NMAG started paying more
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attention to things....But see we are the ones that have resources and we have
missions.” NFA
“There are too many groups in the program that don’t offer anything. I’ll just be
blunt. But they can come to the Executive Committee and tie the works up. You
know and that’s, I don’t think that’s right. I think you want to have stakeholders,
but you want to have stakeholders that are able to help solve the problem and not
just obfuscating the problem.” NFA
“We feel that one individual farmer or one individual pueblo that can tie that up is
probably not the best way to be collaborative.” NFA
“The federal agencies, I mean they basically are the ones who have the primary
responsibility for compliance with ESA.” NFA
“The City’s exposure for coverage, the need to be in the program for coverage is
not a really extreme need, it’s a passing need but it really wouldn’t want to drop
out of the program because so much happens in the Rio Grande basin in the Metro
area that it has got to have direct involvement in some of this activity.” NFA
“The disproportionate part has to do with resources and control.” NFA
“My suspicion is that the program itself won’t be able to continue because of the
mismatch between what coverage you need and why you’d be in the program at
all if you didn’t need coverage.” NFA
“We are all going to court and the big boys are going to try to strike deals.”NFA
“Reclamation is going to end up holding the bag.” FRA
Funding Problems

The two major problems of funding for the program are (1) the retirement of
Senator Domenici, who as Chair of Appropriations was able to direct a great deal of
federal money to the program and (2) the steep decline in federal funding due to national
economic factors. A third problem, that of federal inefficiency will be dealt with in the
section 6.3.3.
“…is trying to move from this collaborative effort to what is called a RIP which
has been done around the county for other fish, but we have to get that
institutionalized by congress so the funding level gets a little more regular.” NFA
“The Collaborative Program did well for many years because of Senator
Domenici’s direct intervention in federal funding procedures and apparatus. But
now that’s gone. So funding has gone down terrifically in the last couple of years
since he’s been gone.” NFA
“…and money because they’ve (other programs) got those power generation
projects and such and they bleed off that. So they’ve got water and money. The
Platte has water. I mean, we don’t have either one and when the budget got

60

reshuffled the Middle Rio Grande took a disproportionate hit in the budget
reshuffle than the other areas” NFA
“Well part of the problem is that the people who are making decision about where
collaborative, where funding goes, which projects get funded, they are conflicted
because they want to get their own projects funded, so there’s a problem there’s a
conflict problem with making those kinds of budget decisions.” FRA
Natural, Regulatory and Programmatic Uncertainty

Natural Uncertainty

Climate change is expected to dramatically affect the MRG and current drought
conditions have many participants wondering how an already strained hydrologic system
can produce what the Program needs in annual “wet” water.
“…its already the second week in February and the big storms are not lining up.
Its just not going to be there. So the program is starting to look at what we can do
for the minnow in that set of circumstances, do we have the water, can we get the
water to have a spike and have some recruitment and slow that down so we can
try and get some fish back out there, thing like that, those are ongoing within the
program now.” FRA
Regulatory Uncertainty

Participants continually cite the need for clearer obligations to be identified by FWS
in terms of what it takes to comply with the ESA. As the process of consultation reinitiates, compliance standards, annual metrics for compliance are frequently discussed.
“…it will probably end up going to litigation. I wouldn’t bet on it succeeding. The
only way it would succeed is if there was major clarity and 100% commitment in
terms of what was being laid down by the regulatory agencies and then buy in
from agencies with all the resources and from what I can tell they are too far apart
to close that gap now.” FRA
“…because I think that the one thing that would be the savior is for FWS, because
they are the regulator, for FWS to be completely transparent and come clean on
what it takes to comply.” NFA
“…right the draft opinion, they want to see a draft opinion before they make their
final commitments.” FRA
“People don’t want to sign on to the RIP until they know what the service really
wants and that’s, to me that’s fair, you know I mean, well I signed up to
contribute to this, well to contribute to what? Well nobody does that you know, so
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this, the service is helping to draft the RIP document. The RIP documents, to be
realistic and here is really what we think you can do. But until people know what
the speeding ticket is, you know you can’t decide whether to pay it or not.” NFA
“Fish and wildlife sort of should be playing the role of the scientists, you know
the investigators, the ones who are very curious about is this working? is this not
working? They don’t seem to be that way and they do some research stuff. They
have done some stuff on the ground but there is very little communication with
the collaborative program. And there seems to be a real reluctance to kind of go
beyond what has already been established as what the minnow’s needs are and in
some ways a little bit of a refusal that there is a hydrologic reality that we have to
work with and that there may be some things we can do different that still allow
the species and the ecosystem to recover a little bit.” NFA
Programmatic Uncertainty

Due to the complexity of the Program’s current transitional state and the level of
fatigue that apparently accompanies it, some members believe it may be too much for the
organization to handle. There are also issues of program structure and its effects on
accountability that threaten to diminish any reforms that may be accomplished by the
establishment of the RIP.
“ My personal perception of it is that the program is verging on kind of imploding
sort of falling in on itself due to the sheer weight of things that it has to do, how
much its trying to do at one time and the amount of party lines that all the
agencies are now sort of setting up party lines.” NFA
“I think its both quantitative and qualitative, quantitative in the sense that there is
too much at once and qualitative in the sense that the things that are happening all
at the same time are inherently so difficult on their own that when you compound
them then you’ve really got it rolled up, so its like I don’t know what, like going
through a divorce and putting your kids through college. They’re independent but
they are so big that how do you solve one without the other or independently?”
NFA
“So every signatory now is going to have to sign its own agreement, apart from
signing on as being part of the RIP, then every individual signatory is going to
have to sign separate agreements and so there’s hidden costs that are going to be
shared that were never revealed at the beginning.” NFA
“It may be that this is dealt with in their individual management agreement with
the Program(for membership in the RIP). So you see there is a blanket agreement
that all the signatories sign on and then there’s individual agreements that all of us
negotiate on our own that we don’t know what the other entities are having to
negotiate. So very, see this is why merely proposing one structure (the RIP) to
replace another structure (the MRGESCP) is not a guarantee that its any better
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because they set up a system that there’s a certain amount that’s out in the open
and then the rest of it the real nitty gritty is all done behind closed doors and we
don’t know what the other person is negotiating.” NFA
“Its too far to turn back as far as the transition, we let a one year clock run for a
year and a half and we are just simply out of time. And the number of things that
are still unresolved have piled up and we are not going to get them solved any
faster doing things the old way.” NFA
“The protection against litigation ends on March 16 and they have now created a
timeline that allows seven months for lawsuits to be filed by the Environmental
Community.”NFA
The Doe lawsuit against MRGCD, Texas Lawsuit against NM on the Rio Grande,
these are huge, huge things that change everything about water in the river,
everything.” NFA
“The collaboration isn’t going well it has a lot of structural problems, there is a
long way we have to go, but we’re not going to make progress any other way. So
we have to find a way to make it work, we are all in this together. And the
collaborative program also was determined to not be working and this was part of
the impetus for the RIP.” FRA
“So many people are still so entrenched in their own agency viewpoints, and its
from both sides its from the species side and from the water users side, we both
go in there, all of us enter these processes to protect our own interests first and
people have not yet adopted this mindset that we are going into this to solve the
problem as opposed to protect our own interests and I think until you can get past
that, that philosophical barrier than I don’t think it matters how much time you
put in, its not going to make any difference in the outcome.” NFA
6.2.2 Trust Based Incentives
REL

Trust is a dynamic factor in the MRGESCP. Because of the collaborative nature
of the process, trust building takes place in the forum of “working relationships.”
Individuals felt they had a much better concept of the interests of other parties,
understanding of individual personalities and felt a general sense that it was harder to
distrust or dislike someone you were actually interacting with though interactions still
proceeded in wariness:
“Certainly its easier to have hostility towards someone you don’t know
personally, so collaboration always helps in that sense, but I think we are in a trust
yet verify situation, none of the parties are going to trust another party implicitly.”
FRA
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“All parties have learned a lot about what each of what our individual agencies do
and what our perspectives are. You know maybe there is an inherent amount of
trust just by understanding. But I still see a huge amount of distrust going on
between you know the non fed folks and even the fed folks. A lot of it is aimed at
the FWS as the regulatory agency in the room, so yah I don’t know. To some
degree there has been some trust building, but probably not as much as needs to
be.” FRA
“Even reclamation is going to slicing and dicing, you know drought tends to
really accentuate peoples differences too so I think the fact that we are going
through this at the same time there is a drought makes the trust a little more
tenuous and a, but at the same time I think as long as there is that core program I
think you sort of have to trust that eventually you’ll get there and I think that
everybody feels that way.” NFA
“ …but at my level yes (there is trust). But the reason is because I spend more
time with those people in the agencies.” NFA
At the same time, progress that is made through working together is countered by
trust issues stemming from:
Cost
Protection of interests
Inconsistency of agencies and individuals
Partner Agency to Partner Agency Dynamics and
Individual personalities
Cost related trust issues

Partners see cost affecting trust in two ways. (1) Trust is tested in times of limited
financial resources as cooperation and agreement over how to spend funds is strained. (2)
Past spending for various functions is harder to justify when results for the spending are
not seen.
“Okay so I do believe there are trust issues but I think that people are generally
trying to work on those. The question becomes as we go to a RIP with less money
to do more things, what’s going to happen?” NFA
“Trust or distrust has always been a significant factor. It has been an undercurrent
in our end relationships as far back as I can remember. So it isn’t like trust
suddenly emerged as being a big issue. Its always been there, its just what form it
takes. Trust or distrust has gotten magnified more recently, primarily because of
the dwindling of the other most-scarce resource beside water and that’s money.”
NFA
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“…the collaborative program says oh yeah we are going to do restoration in the
Albuquerque reach, the City places it here, and for that million dollars, 25% of it
had to be in-kind contributions from the non-federal entities. We are on a 25%
cost share which is a screaming deal, but 25% of that million dollars is paid by
people like me’s tax dollars or actually state of New Mexico because ISC has
footed a large part of the cash bill” NFA
“We have spent $170 million and the minnow is doing worse than it has ever,
since we started measuring it, its at its lowest numbers. So that’s one thing its just
all this effort that we have put into it hasn’t secured the future for the minnow.”
FRA
Protection of interests related trust issues

Partner’s tend to believe that most Program participants would do what they could to
protect their interests first. They did not trust that their interests would necessarily be
accounted for by parties other than themselves.
“I think, I am sure everybody is going to protect their interests, whether it is done
through collaboration or it is done through the legal system or it is done through
administrative process.” NFA
“People don’t want to sign on to the RIP until they know what the service really
wants.” NFA
“You mean through uncompensated takings and having the people that own the
water rights get their water moved around without any idea what the heck was
going on?” NFA
“Everybody is playing a game, trying to maintain what they, what rights and
abilities they have, you know to serve their constituents and to meet these needs
and collaborate and there is a balance on everybody’s part.” FRA
“…but the real reason that everyone is there is to cover their own asses and
people have a hard time moving off of that into a truly collaborative program.”
FRA
Inconsistency of agencies and individuals

Inconsistency was reported as a function of both agency personnel turnover and as
a problem of unclear trajectory on the part of agencies, especially FWS.
“You know it depends on the personalities more than anything else…the district is
probably kind of unusual in this in that just probably because of Doe, Doe’s been
there forever. There is no change at the district. It’s a very conservative, old
fashioned kind of glacial pace. The same people have been around for this
through the whole process. But at the Bureau on the other hand, every two or
three years there is a new area manager. Some of them we’ve gotten along really
well, some of them I trusted implicitly. Some of them I just didn’t trust. The
65

Corps, what is it every eighteen months they change colonels? And they always
send in a good person, umm but there’s that period of change when a new face
shows up and they don’t have twelve years experience with all this and there’s all
these relationships going back and there is a constant turnover of personalities and
personnel and it takes a while to get you know, to kind of feel out those new
personalities....you meet these people and you spend more time in meetings with
them and you have some discussion with them outside the program meetings and
eventually you decide whether you can trust them or not.” NFA
“So I have often tried to ask the right questions at the right time and you often
find you don’t really get the right answer. But it’s a repetitive kind of cycle that
after awhile you get a little disillusioned about it. Somebody says well we’ve
really looked at it and we’ve decided that creating the RIP is the easiest and best
thing to do right now. And they lay out what is generally involved and that sounds
good actually and let’s get that started a year ahead of time, and then a whole year
goes by and you are really not as close as you should be after a year and then you
find out that there are a whole lot of other details involved. So every signatory
now is going to have to sign its own agreement, apart from signing on as being
part of the RIP, then every individual signatory is going to have to sign separate
agreements and so there’s hidden costs that are going to be shared that were never
revealed at the beginning, so there’s all sorts of stuff that happens like that.” NFA
“So we were kind of led far down that path (the RIP) by the service and then they
stepped way away from it like it was a lump of kryptonite or something like that,
it’s a mysterious process to watch…” NFA
“But you know things are all up in the air now. The current plan, you know,
reclamation was planning to propose the RIP in its new plan and that’s what we
were going to do consultation over, plus the water ops plus the RIP and now, you
know at the last meeting they told everyone that they are going to pull back and
not, they are going to pull the RIP out of their proposal” NFA
Partner Agency to Partner Agency Dynamics

Many of the agency to agency trust dynamics were the products of historical
interaction. The historical state versus federal conflicts appeared in this context. They
also relate to the above category of protection of interests.
“When Pete Domenici announced his retirement, the reaction in the room was
blatant. The next meeting of the collaborative program, the gloves were off,
because now Domenici wasn’t here to protect anybody any more and FWS went
“oh my God they don’t have anyone to protect them anymore, now we can really
go after, we think, you know they’ve been hiding water on us all along.” NFA
“I think because a lot of people complain that what the service has been
mandating is draconian and not based on sound science.” FRA
“Because the conservancy district survives primarily by shifting responsibilities
onto others. That’s how they have survived for eighty-five years and its not going
to change.” NFA
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“Honestly it has to do with them being given a 180 degree different directive at
higher political levels, so a really good example was, and this was about a year
ago, they came and they made a really hard pitch that they were going to be the
agency that should manage the RIP. They had presentations they had handouts,
this has been done elsewhere, this is the best way to go and there was severe push
back because all of the non-feds don’t want to have a federal agency involved in
it” NFA
“Are there trust issues within the Collaborative Program? Yeah for sure there is,
especially between the ISC and the service, there are some others. The District
doesn’t really trust anybody. And I am not picking on anybody. If that’s the way
they choose to run their program and operate in the Collaborative Program then
okay and that’s what the rest of us have to get around.”NFA
Individual personalities

Non-federal entities especially emphasized the importance of personalities to
dynamics in the Program. On several occasions these were implicated in broader
conspiracy ideas, perceived problems of discount rate and general dishonesty.
“…and whether or not when somebody says something, is it really what they
mean or is there some kind of maneuver involved, you know its constant kind of
calculations that are involved you know. So there’s also thematically, there is the
difference between what an agency says it needs to do in terms of its policies or
its party line and then how it is that the individuals themselves carry that mandate
out. So sometimes you’ve got an agency that really is difficult to work with but
you’ve got some people in there that are willing to kind of overcome that on an
interpersonal level and you can get further. And it can be completely the opposite
way around where you’ve got agencies where their mission is kind of down the
middle…but there individual actors are, you sometimes wonder if what they are
saying is just constantly their personal opinion or whether they are speaking on
behalf of the agency. And so there’s this frequent thing that somebody will come
to a meeting and say well this is what we are going to do and then you find out
that behind the scenes that they are saying the total opposite to people or they
have subcommittee meetings and they are saying one thing in front of a big group
and behind closed doors in a smaller setting, you know its just on and on and well,
how do I know what, who the real whoever is?... I have tried to follow the
statements of different people in different settings and finally figured out that
there are people who are just damned good at saying totally different things in
totally different settings. Its amazing to me.” NFA
“… is an extraordinarily political guy who does not live within the benefitted area
of the district.” NFA
“… you can’t tell me that if someone in her position wanted to put the cards on
the table she could either do it or if she didn’t have the authority to go to someone
like John Doe and say to make this work, this is really what we need to do and do
it.” NFA
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6.3 Relationship/Interest/Pressure Intersection: Power/Advantage/Cost
Integral to relationships and Program structural elements that affect incentives to
invest in the MRGESCP are three interactive factors of power-, advantage- and costbased incentives. Each of these factors came from one of the three divisions of this
study’s Analytic Framework: relationship, interest and pressure respectively. They are
presented together before explaining pressure-based incentives (following Figure 4) to
explain how they affect Pressure-based incentives that in turn affect the structure of the
program as a whole.
6.3.1Power Dynamics Based Incentives
POW

Important power-based incentives exist for the federal regulator, action agencies
as well as existed for former Senator Domenici in how to initiate and manage the
Program. For the Service, the power lies in having ultimate say in how compliance for
the ESA will be met by all regulated parties. For Reclamation, power exists in deciding
how and what to fund as it supplies much of the current Project funding. For Senator
Domenici, senior senator and Appropriations Chair with strong ties to the State and City,
power lied in the ability to draft legislation that superseded the court and exempted action
agencies from litigation under the 2003 BO. These three factors have a lasting influence
on the structure of the program and thus advantage and integrally important, cost
provision:
“as an example with FWS…they can mandate that water be used and the agencies
that control water can just be told.” NFA
“The ESA says thou shalt and they can require pretty much anything of the
federal entities to make it happen but there is more leniency to the local entities.”
FRA
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“We’re okay with reclamation using a $9-10 million budget to fund projects, but
the problem is of course, they have kind of veto power I guess on what that could
be used for the funding is.” NFA
“Pete Domenici’s connections to Albuquerque were deep he owned property here
he had been a CEO of the city of Albuquerque, he was a speculator in real estate
here in Albuquerque, a lot of things about Pete Domenici…” NFA
“Senator Domenici was very instrumental, basically I think he ordered us all into
it. Okay, he said, here’s a way for you guys to all play nice and get along and do
it. .” NFA
6.3.2 Advantage Based Incentives
ADV

Advantages that exist under the current structure, not only of the Program, but the
entities at the table provide certain kinds of advantage within the framework of the
program. These were identified by partners as:
Distribution of responsibility among all partners
Legislated exclusions of water resources that alter cost apportionment and parity
differentially among stakeholders
The regulatory hierarchy which offers the Service disproportionate decision
power and
The accountability structure of the program or various partners -some agencies
are not easily held responsible for their activities.

In the case of the Corps an advantage may be in their limited involvement in water
operations:
“Problems with the species occur largely when the system runs out of water,
referred to as the lower end of the hydrograph. Corps authorities really deal with
the upper end of the hydrograph when there is too much water in the system, aka
flood control. So clearly over the last ten years, the minnow and the flycatcher are
in trouble, not because of large floods, but because of lack of water.” FRA
Distribution of responsibility among all partners

Distribution of responsibility is an advantage in that it allows the entire Program to
attend to problems that may be caused by a single party that would have originally been
that party’s duty to reconcile. As is shown in the cost section below, nearly all program
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costs are borne by the federal government. This may alleviate direct costs to individuals
whose activities may be responsible for species damage.
“We got to the point through the lawsuits where the BOR, FWS and Corps, the
three fed entities and the district and the ISC, the two principle non-fed entities
came to the conclusion that somehow we could enter this collaborative program.”
NFA
“…the RIP as being something like setting up an insurance pool. So all of the
agencies, all of the signatories are in as far as their liability, but what kind of
coverage you get and how is radically disproportionate.” NFA
Legislated exclusions of water resources that alter cost apportionment and parity
differentially among stakeholders

As described previously, the minnow rider provided specific advantage to the
users of SJCP water which could be leased to the federal government. This gave them a
source of funding, protected their water uses and, some believe shifted the burden from
all water users to agricultural users. Since most of the water used by the Program has
been SJCP water, it also shifted a large amount of the funding burden to the federal tax
payer and away from the non-federal water user. It sheltered all parties to the program
from outside litigation through the end of the 2003 BO on March 16, 2013.
“(Reclamation) may not use discretion, if any, to restrict, reduce or reallocate any
water stored in Heron Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San Juan-Chama Project
contracts, including execution of said contracts facilitated by the Middle Rio
Grande Project, to meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, unless
such water is acquired or otherwise made available from a willing seller or lessor”
(H.R. 2754-23§208)
“Complying with the reasonable and prudent alternatives and the incidental take
limits defined in the Biological Opinion released by the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service dated March 17, 2003 combined with efforts carried out pursuant
to Public Law 106-377, Public Law 107-66, and Public Law 108-7 fully meet all
requirements of the Endangered Species Act” (H.R. 2754-23§208)
“…Domenici. So he went, to protect Albuquerque, he put a rider in on an
appropriations bill that specified the SJCP water could not be used for endangered
species, he took it off the table.” NFA
“…because it (Use of SJCP water) was the first time that agriculture had ever
been, had any kind of parity with cities. Always in these things, agriculture pays,
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and cities are the junior users and vote to have this crap in here and feel no pain
from what they vote for.” NFA
“Reclamation’s primary contribution to the species is to take SJCP water and run
it down the river to maintain flows in the summer time. Its SJCP water.” FRA
“A lot of that water was leased or used by Reclamation.” FRA
The regulatory hierarchy which offers the Service disproportionate decision power

The Service’s advantage is simply that it is the regulatory agency. As a partner, it
has a disproportionately powerful role in that it signs off on Program activities and their
compliance with the ESA.
“…FWS who has almost ultimate control in a regulatory sense but doesn’t have to
give up any resource what so ever in the process.” NFA
“FWS, there only downside is that if the whole thing blows up, they might be
accused of having caused it to blow up, but they don’t have water using
constituents, so they can mandate that water be used and the agencies that control
water can just be told.” NFA

The accountability structure of the program or various partners -some
agencies are not easily held responsible for their activities.

Another form of advantage experienced by some partners is in a lack of
accountability. Most notable is the MRGCD, which is most often cited as unaccountable.
This serves to their advantage in that they are not easily litigated against. From both
ENGO and irrigator perspectives, this is sheltering to the MRGCD. For ENGO’s,
Reclamation is a better target with deep pockets, federal agency mandates under the ESA
and potential ability to alter MRGCD water use. For irrigators, the complication is the
lack of adjudication on the MRG. The MRGCD distributes what some believe to be
senior appropriator’s water for species needs, while requiring end of season shortage
sharing between junior and senior users. This is technically illegal and the lack of public
records kept by the district is seen as an affront to senior right holders. Unfortunately, the
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State of New Mexico is committed to not starting the adjudication process in the MRG
and therefore cannot enforce priority.
“The MRGCD may have control over a lot of the water, but they aren’t going to
give up anything for the sake of the program succeeding. Zero.” NFA
“They are quasi-municipal they can tax people, they can undertake, any kind of
construction process on their own likes, and they don’t have that NEPA
(requirement), you know (to) have to demonstrate that they’ve got the best
alternative and that its not going to damage the environment. They don’t have that
responsibility. So in a way its structure is kind of a Frankenstein. To whom are
they accountable? Looking at things today they’ve got this elected board so
there’s a lot more accountability evident in 2013 than there was in 2003.” NFA
“MRGCD is a black hole, they don’t keep public records of water they release for
species needs.” NFA
“The conservancy district survives primarily by shifting responsibilities onto
others. That’s how they have survived for eighty-five years and its not going to
change…I mean it is in the gene pool, it is baked in the cake over there. I don’t
care if you are reading some document from the 1930’s, 50’s,70’s, 90’s there are
always saying that ain’t our problem.”NFA
“They are in a unique position, they have never really had to answer to anybody
because their return flows either do or don’t get down to Elephant Butte, ring the
compact bell and all is well. They are not competing with anyone else. There is no
accountability they have with anybody else about their water use. So since the
20’s their operating paradigm has been take it all and let the return flow go to
satisfy the state’s obligation.” NFA
“There really isn’t kind of a convenient (legal) handle on the district and then
another thing is unlike a typical irrigation district that’s created at the behest or
with cooperation of Reclamation, this was a creature of state law that has broader
powers and a different organizational structure than an irrigation district.” NFA

Reclamation is also cited as having an accountability related advantage in that it
controls funding with very little outside oversight on where the money is spent. In
this their inefficiencies are less likely to be controlled by other entities in the
Program.
“The second problem is that the federal end, a tremendous amount of money has
been directed toward the program from federal sources and when going through
the Bureau’s contracting arm, it has a remarkable propensity to disappear…there
isn’t any accountability, trying to see where the money went is an impossibility
right now.” NFA
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“So I think part of it is that federal, you it just gets, it starts here and its just
shrinks. And then in the end, when it finally gets funded, nobody even knows its
been funded, nobody knows what its been funded for, nobody knows what
direction its going, so there’s all these real issues that I don’t know how to fix,
because I’ve been spending years trying to fix it with Reclamation.” NFA
6.3.3 Cost Based Incentives (Pressure)
COS

Provision of cost is one of the most important factors in the incentive structure of
the program. Integrally intertwined with the above factors of power and advantage, cost
provision plays a fundamental role in the level of pressure the Program exerts on
participants and influences the trajectory of the collaborative process. Participant
responses regarding cost focused on two important dynamics. (1) cost for program
activities is dramatically disproportionate with nearly all cost borne by the federal
government. (2) federal control of cost has resulted in inefficiency and unfair control over
the process:
“...fundamental problems with the existing program. One of which is I believe the
non-federal entities probably do not really pony up their fair share of cost. I think
we have all, here’s this looking out for our own interests, I think we have all very
successfully managed to shift all of the burden onto the federal tax payer. Sorry to
say it, that’s what we do, but I don’t think its right. I think if we are going to be
successful then more of the costs will have to be borne by the local interests. The
second problem is that the federal end, a tremendous amount of money has been
directed toward the program from federal sources and when going through
Reclamation’s contracting arm, it has a remarkable propensity to disappear. It
wouldn’t shock me to find out that maybe only 25% of the money that was
directed into the collaborative program actually got used productively. A
tremendous amount just goes to increasing federal staffing at Bureau and FWS.
On the ground projects don’t happen all that much and when they do they are
bloated with admin costs, so I see that as a big problem. So even though the
Federal cost share is quite large what is accomplished with it is not.” NFA
Cost Share for the program was decided to be 75% federal and 25% non-federal
based on an expectation that New Mexico’s small economy would not be able to support
much more of a contribution.
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“John Doe, so he’s been co-chairing, but a lot of funding comes through
reclamation and I’m not as up to speed on that but Reclamation does get funding
that then gets channeled through the CP and then they fund different projects and
you know reclamation actually pays for a bunch of FWS staff positions, FTE’s
and things like that” FRA
That cost share, I think there are a lot of good financial reasons for that, you know
it might end up that there are higher contributions above and beyond 25%,
anyway but we don’t have the kinds of industries that allow a 50/50, we are one
small little state, not very rich, farmers, and so its difficult to conceive of how we
would come up with more than that, plus so many of the problems are federal
problems, to be honest, a lot of the construction stuff is what created the problems
to begin with and I don’t think that’s fair, been really even acknowledged.” NFA
”I am not sure how that was decided, I suspect it was just sort of a general
regulation. I have no knowledge of whether its something that is done 75/25
whether that’s just a matter of course for these kinds of things or whether that’s
something special to this program.” NFA
“I guess that my answer to that would be that the feds might be paying for the
lion’s share but the non-feds have the lion’s share to lose. If the program is a
failure so…” FRA
Some see this as fair as the origin of program costs are a federal law. However it is
contended that non-federal actors have effectively claimed to be supporting 25% of total
costs when their 25% contribution is for non-water, non-staff contributions.
“Let me tell you the truth about that…the truth of the matter is, Reclamation
spends money on water, personnel and then Collaborative Program activities. And
there is only a small proportion of the activities that’s actually cost shared 25%.
So when you look at the over-all budget, and I think they actually had some readaheads when they, yeah I think its actually posted. But you can see the overall
cost and how much the non-feds have contributed it’s a true cost share of about
10%. So amongst recovery programs that’s very unusual. Congress will usually,
they won’t authorize a recovery program that has that cheap of a deal… its very
different, and its just, its just New Mexico politics that on the one hand they can
pretend its 25%, but you have to say, 25% of the non-water and the non-people
activities and reclamation spends most of its money on water and people.” FRA
Senator Domenici’s role in Cost structuring stems from the passing the minnow rider,
which made SJCP and Compact Credit water available for lease from willing sellers.
“The minnow rider, says that Reclamation, well it says that the secretary shall
create a collaborative program and an Executive Committee and a Collaborative
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Program and any water that needs to be acquired for the purposes of the
Collaborative Program are paid for by Reclamation.” FRA

Finally, is stated that even the portion actually paid by the non-federal partners (ISC
is the largest non-federal contributor) is actually federal in origin.
“It isn’t an equitable distribution. I mean the feds pay 75% and the locals combine
to pay 25% and whatever, that’s fine, but the only one that ever turns in any
documentation that they actually need that 25% is the state of New Mexico and
the state of New Mexico, all of the money spent on the collaborative program by
the state of New Mexico including staff and on the ground projects comes from
the federal government. Because its either through grants through the
Collaborative Program for habitat restoration projects, things like that, or through
the money that Reclamation pays to the state of New Mexico for its relinquished
compact credits. “ FRA
The costs for running the program, are in the main, coming out of federal
agencies, its mostly Bureau funding, the Bureau gets the direct funding and then
administers the Program. Then you know indirectly there’s quite a bit of funding
or parallel cost from like the Army Corps, and then the non-fed side is supposedly
cost sharing and the ISC used to carry a huge amount of the cost sharing. But they
have said you know times being what they are at the state agency level they can’t
be expected to continue to carry the ball for all the non federal agencies as far as
cost share.” NFA

Inefficiency on the part of the federal government is cited as equivalently
unproductive. This appears to be an area where Senator Domenici was vital in steering
the productivity of the Program.
“I kind of liked it when we were able to earmark that money that Domenici was
able to appropriate for certain projects because you knew that’s what it was going
to get used for.” NFA
“What can my agency do with $600,000 to make sure that funding, you know
projects get on the ground, projects get placed- a lot! So I think part of it is that
federal, you it just gets, it starts here and it just shrinks. And then in the end, when
it finally gets funded, nobody even knows its been funded, nobody knows what its
been funded for, nobody knows what direction its going, so there’s all these real
issues that I don’t know how to fix, because I’ve been spending years trying to
fix it with Reclamation” NFA
“The CP did well for many years because of Senator Domenici’s direct
intervention in federal funding procedures and apparatus. But now that’s gone. So
75

funding has gone down terrifically in the last couple of years since he’s been
gone.” NFA
6.4 Pressure Based Incentives
6.4.1Incentive Building and Mutual Gains Based Incentives
COV, INC

Coverage is a term that developed out of the interview process and was integrated
into the Analytic Framework for the data analysis portion. It originally appeared as an
answer to the question: “How satisfied is (partner) with the Program’s ability to develop
mutually beneficial options or exchanges that allow more investment or buy-in from
various non federal partners?” The basis of the question was found in Ury and Fischer
(1981) and referred to the process outlined in Figure 2. The process enables negotiated
solutions that become mutually beneficial and “expand the pie” from the kind of zero
sum bargaining that often results in insufficient solutions and continued problems for the
negotiators.
The original theme code used to describe this kind of behavior in the Analytic
Framework was incentive building (INC). When the question was asked, it was often
greeted with negative responses. Eventually the word coverage was used to describe the
antithesis of incentive building negotiation, which was to use the Program as legal and
financial coverage for status quo operations of various parties while contributing as little
as possible. Using the direct answers to the question above and broader references to
some form of coverage, responses were gathered to reflect multiple perspectives on the
how these two themes interacted. They are both considered part of pressure-based
incentives as one shows a level of sheltering necessity to a given party (Coverage). The
other (Incentive Building) could mobilize pro-active behavior based more on mutual
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benefit and buy-in to a common goal than necessity to shelter. The latter is considered to
be more effective in problem solving. Responses included:
“There is certain momentum that gets developed that is good, but the real reason
that everyone is there is to cover their own asses and people have a hard time
moving off of that into a truly collaborative program.” FRA
“Because we have our own BO, you know we’re real worried about that, we don’t
want that thing to blow up because you know we don’t want our BO reinitiated,
that’s just not a good way to do things. That’s another reason why we participate
in the CP is to protect our interest within our own BO.” NFA
“Mostly its coverage.” NFA
“Who needs coverage and how are they going to get it.” NFA
“I think as a collaboration we all can get protection that way.” NFA
Kind of referred to now as the big six. It was the big five and then NMAG started
paying more attention to things....But see we are the ones that have resources and
we have missions.” NFA
“Well first of all the ESA is a federal law so that subjection to the federal courts
and all that stuff is not necessarily bad but that is the main concern.” NFA
“You know the ESA consultation with the federal agencies, I mean they basically
are the ones who have the primary responsibility for compliance with ESA and
the move toward this RIP is partly to make it so that there is a more fairly
distributed relationship there for compliance.” NFA
“They would basically like to use the RIP to protect their water uses, current
water uses and contribute a little bit to recovery but they lack this commitment.”
FRA
“Everybody is playing a game, trying to maintain what they, what rights and
abilities they have, you know to serve their constituents and to meet these needs
and collaborate and there is a balance on everybody’s part.” FRA
“I mean we have as agencies we have all managed to come together and come up
with a way to just keep the thing limping along.” NFA
“I think a the hammer, I mean you either comply with the law or you don’t
comply with the law. Hammer. I think you want to comply with the law, if you
want to work together.” NFA
“I think everyone has an interest in protecting their interest, and everyone also has
interest in complying with the law. So those are two of the couple of things that
keeps people together.” NFA
“I would say probably not overall pleased.” NFA
“The chiefs have to sit down and you know kind of the heads have to talk so
that’s good too.” NFA
“I think there’s a lot of resistance to moving forward and having some belief that
some of the things were doing could do some good, there seems to be so much
reluctance to actually do anything until we know its going to do good. So its more
internal to the collaborative program that’s been the problem I think. “ NFA
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“Altruism? (Laugh) I think its risk management mostly, I think that’s what brings
people to the table.” FRA
“I think its umm, probably not very satisfactory and its probably getting
progressively less satisfactory, and sort of approaching, my personal perception of
it is that the program is verging on kind of imploding” NFA
One description cited benefits outside of coverage as more advantageous than
collaborative:
“People come to the table to feed. There was not a single participant at the
collaborative program who doesn’t get money out of the program. They get
projects funded. I mean there was a period of time where the environmental
groups, there were some environmental groups there for a while, participating in
scopes of work development and getting the contracts. When reclamation dropped
the hammer on appropriate contracting processes and avoiding the conflict of
interest of having a contract recipient having engaged in drafting the scope of
work, that they are then responding to, when they dropped the hammer on that,
there are no environmentalists at the table any more.” NFA
Over all, there appeared to be little in the way of collectively attempted expansion of
options available. While the collaborative benefits mentioned earlier were able to bring
together partners in cooperative work, most participants seemed dissatisfied, at least with
the current levels of productive group behavior.
6.4.2 Discount Rates and Voice
DIS, VOI

Discount rate was an important factor as well in developing Pressure based
incentives. “Skin in the Game” was referred to on a number of occasions to refer to a
level of necessity. Various levels of need for coverage were described. In economic
terms, farmers were considered by some to be the only entities with a direct connection
between ESA compliance and their livelihoods. Agencies with little need for coverage or
more limited interaction with species needs also pointed to the potential for variability in
discount rate:
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“So everybody would have had to contribute if SJCP water was on the table and
that, I mean how else to you get people at the table if they don’t have any skin at
the game?” NFA
“ Its not that we haven’t really been willing or wanting to collaborate in this
forum we just don’t have that much skin kin the game.” FRA
“Exposure for coverage, the need to be in the program for coverage is not a really
extreme need.” NFA
“FWS, there only downside is that if the whole thing blows up, they might be
accused of having caused it to blow up, but they don’t have water using
constituents, so they can mandate that water be used and umm the agencies that
control water can just be told.” NFA
“…who does not live within the benefitted area of the District.” NFA
“Cities are the junior users and vote to have this crap in here feel no pain from
what they vote for.” NFA
“You know and its hard for to tell with the federal entities have better than an
obligation to fulfill a regulatory requirement, check a box off.” NFA
“…when it’s a job that you walk away from at five o’clock and you checked off
your box and there’s no real consequences.” NFA
“You know Jane Doe? Okay, I don’t know if you’ve spoken to her yet. I’m going
to use her as an example, she represents, in my opinion kind of where the rubber
meets the road. She’s a farmer, a dairy farmer, so her livelihood depends on the
water and umm I appreciate the fact that she brings that to the table, because she
is having to fight through all these federal regs in order to maintain her livelihood.
She’s got to deal with the ESA, she’s got to deal with the State and all of the
people that kind of have their hand on the spigot if you will and so yeah so she’s
got to be clearly involved with what goes on with respect to the ESA because its
her livelihood” FRA
Voice (VOI) is a theme that signified an important “representational role.” For
instance, a party with either limited or duplicated stake in Coverage, either for structural
reasons or based on alliances with other entities, could be driven to participate by the
need to have input on a given situation. In the next section these players will be described
in terms of their subject positions to avoid confidentiality issues.

6.5 Combined Subject Positions
The results of coding analysis for this study point to some important incentive
based elements experienced by the parties in collaboration. As stated by participants in
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the previous sections, disparities exist between the need for coverage, control of
resources and the reasons for being drawn to the program. These disparities divide
Program participants and show differing orientations of stakeholders to the Program itself
and various members’ participation in it. Coding took into account not only the Analytic
Themes described in the previous four sections, but also their intersection with
combinations of subject positions that characterized stakeholders.
Subject positions applied to stakeholders were:
FRA Federal Regulatory/Action Agency
NFA Non-Federal Actor
SNC Strong Need for Coverage
WNC Weak Need for Coverage
EXST – Has some exogenous/internal structural advantage
RESources- Has resources, either water, land, monetary
DUPlicative- Disadvantageous or secondary (less influential) dual
representative

These characterized stakeholders in seven subject position categories:
1. FRA, SNC, RES, EXST
2. NFA, SNC, RES, EXST
3. NFA, WNC, RES, EXST
4. NFA, SNC, RES
5. NFA, SNC, DUP, RES
6. NFA, DUP, EXST
7. NFA, DUP, RES, EXST

These subject position combinations and their intersecting relationships with
incentive themes from previous sections is described in Table 2 below. Some interesting
relationships are visible between various stakeholder orientations. The following quotes
are labeled with the applicable subject position category. First, there are those
80

participants that made comments regarding “who has a rightful place at the table” based
on resource control and “agency mission”:
“I think as a collaboration we all can get protection that way, but a, it’s like a,
having negotiations, two party negotiations, but each and everyone has to give in
something or work on something, sometimes we negotiate with a party who has
got nothing.” 2
“Probably the trickiest issue is the Pueblos. How many pueblos do we have as
signatories is it six, five? That’s a lot of members. That’s a lot of people that show
up at meetings and have a vote in the process. Should they choose to have it, but,
and the Pueblos have hard resources, okay? They have land along the RG, they
use water from the river, they’re technically a stakeholder, but at the same time,
the federal agencies have that federal trust obligation to look out for the Pueblo’s
interests. Okay and so the factual result of that is in the program, the Pueblos are
stakeholders, but they are looked out for by another stakeholder.” 2
“Okay Jane Doe, who we all know and love, okay she is a great voice, we like her
in those meetings, but, along those same lines, the MRGCD is obligated to look
out for the land and water resources of middle valley, water resources of
irrigators, okay, so the MRGCD are already looking out for her interests. Why
should she therefore be present at these meetings and participate in this process” 2
“There are too many groups in the program that don’t offer anything. I’ll just be
blunt. But they can come to the EC and tie the works up. You know and that’s, I
don’t think that’s right. I think you want to have stakeholders, but you want to
have stakeholders that are able to help solve the problem and not just obfuscating
the problem.” 2
“I generally think or we generally think its better to be as inclusive as we can but,
if all you can contribute is occasional attendance at meetings, is that the
equivalent weight of the FWS or Reclamation?” 2
“We feel that one individual farmer or one individual pueblo that can tie that up is
probably not the best way to be collaborative.” 2
“For me the path forward is kick everybody out and just work with the Feds. They
have got there responsibilities under the endangered species act so lets just work
the system that way, the rest of this system is just a mess. These people wanting to
poke around and cause problems and they don’t contribute anything.” 1
Statements in this vein were not ubiquitous across these subject position categories (1
and 2). In fact some participants within these categories strongly believed that the
Program’s and their agency’s missions dictated a more inclusive role to play. What was
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ubiquitously true for them however was that none mentioned the potential failure of the
Program, that they directly considered viable legal options outside the Program, or that
collaboration in this context was bound for failure as a means of recovering species and
changing the status quo.
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Table 2: Combined Subject Positions Intersection Matrix

(Mobilizing Factor)
Advantage related
Program related

FRA, SNC, RES, EXST

NFA, SNC, RES, EXST

Fed. Law Relations, Minnow
Rider, Op. Authorities, Coverage

Separate BO, Minnow Rider, Op.
Authorities, Water, Economic, Coverage

Coverage, Political Relations,
Facilitative

Coverage, Political Relations

Control of Trajectory, Outcomes

Control of Trajectory, Outcomes

Political, Collaborative, Trust

Political, Collaborative, Preservative

Distributive, Facilitative

Resources, Op. Authorities,
Coverage

Env., Budgetary, Political, Legal

Preservative, Conservative
Resource, Budgetary, Status Quo,
Tradition, Municipal, Legal

Representation in Process,
Facilitative
Control of Trajectory,
Outcomes
Political, Collaborative,
Preservative
Preservative, Conservative,
Facilitative, Distributive

Political, Collaborative, Trust

Collaborative, Preservative

Collaborative,
Restoration Oriented

Collaborative, Restoration
Oriented, Preservative

Political, Integral Interdependence
Integral Interdependence

Mutual Benefit, Preservative
Preserv., Conserv., Municipal,
Traditional, Economic

Primary to mission under ESA

Cost related
Preservative
Incentive
related

NFA, SNC, RES

Representation in
Process, Facilitative
Control of Trajectory,
Outcomes
Political, Collaborative,
Preservative
Preservative,
Conservative
Budgetary, Env.
Municipal, Legal

Power related
Relationship related

NFA, WNC, RES,
EXST
Limited Need for
Coverage, Op.
Authorities

Budgetary, Legal, Resource

Building

Collaboration related
Social concern
Environmental
concern
Representation
related
Coverage related

Mutual Benefit,
Representational
Municipal

Mutual Benefit, Preservative
Preservative, Legal,
Traditional

Heavily Influences Mission

Municipal, Social

Preservative, Legal, Social,
Proactive

Meeting, Enforcing Compliance,
Coverage

Coverage under ESA, Legal

Mandatory

Legal

Mandatory

Legal

Administrative
Limited,
Representational
Municipal,
Representational

Discount rate related
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Administrative, Legal
Legal, Preservative
Legal, Representational

(Mobilizing Factor)
Advantage related
Program related

NFA, SNC, DUP, RES

NFA, DUP, EXST

NFA, DUP, RES, EXST

State Water Rights

Fed. Law Relations

Fed. Law Relations

Representation in Process

Representation in Process, Facilitative

Representation in Process

Control of Trajectory, Outcomes

Control of Trajectory, Outcomes

Control of Trajectory, Outcomes

Political, Collaborative, Preservative

Political, Collaborative, Preservative

Political, Collaborative, Preservative

Preservative, Conservative

Conservative

Preservative, Conservative

Resource, Tradition, Legal

Env., Budgetary, Legal

Resource, Budgetary, Legal

Altering Status Quo

Collaborative, preservative

Mutual Benefit, Preservative

Env.

Mutual Benefit, Preservative

Preservative, Traditional, Economic

Env., Altering Status Quo

Preservative, Traditional, Economic

Legal, Preservative, Traditional
Traditional, Economic, Preservative,
Legal

Primary to Mission

Traditional

Env., Legal

Traditional, Economic, Preservative, Env., Legal

Legal, Preservative, Traditional

Limited, Representational

Legal, Preservative, Traditional

End User, Critical Economic

Environmental, Representational

Traditional, Representational, Legal

Power related
Relationship related
Cost related
Preservative

Incentive
Building
related
Collaborative, Preservative
Collaboration related
Social concern
Environmental concern
Representation related
Coverage related
Discount rate related
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Statements made in regard to program failure or possible non-collaborative options
led to interest in another phenomenon operating in the Program, that of duplicate roles as
identified in categories 5,6 and 7. Each of these players occupied or could occupy an
alliance with a (politically, financially, or in terms of resource control) stronger
stakeholder. Where there was strong disagreement over how a particular constituency or
position should be represented, the alliance was either wary or openly adversarial. Where
the alliance was not adversarial, it had the potential to be symbiotic in terms of combined
voting power. These relationships could possibly vary on an issue to issue basis. Another
category existed in which overall need for coverage was minimal and in certain legal
scenarios, exposure would be increased by participation in the Program. Combined, these
categories’ participants held some of the strongest criticisms of the Program and their
participants spoke in terms of viable alternatives to collaboration. These stakeholders
were commonly those that expressed a program related concern that was representative
(Voice) which more effectively defined their roles.
Importantly, these entities for which the Collaborative Program was questionable, had
one or another system of “Rule of Law” regulatory structures: either environmental, prior
appropriation, or federal trust authorities to fall back on in litigation. This places the
MRGESCP squarely in the dilemma expressed by Karkainnen (2002, 2008) and others in
chapter 3.3 of this study.
6.6 Adaptive Management/Scientific Legitimacy
In 2009 the program adopted AM as the means by which it would conduct the
RIP science program. A contracted entity performed the design and development of the
program’s AM Plan Version One as a template for a Version Two to be completed by the
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program signatories at a later date (MRGESCP 2011). There is a conflict within the
program over validity of science, availability and propriety of data and generally, from
participant responses, a lack of clear understanding of what species really need.
“I think the program really has to look at reality. And I don’t think so many of
those people are looking at reality, they are just looking at what the biology of the
fish needs, but there are no reality, is it all what we need is available or not, so
program has to look at those realities first. You may think that this is what the
needs are but hydrologically or any, the way may not be possible but we have to
find other solutions by which it could survive through those critical times.” NFA
“That’s true so ten years, ten years ESA process, spend 100 million dollars and
still we are not anyplace.” NFA
“The issue of the fish biology is I think worth considering too, I think the low spot
appeared to be around 2002-3. But the Question that I have always had is: is that
really the low spot? Because monitoring only goes back for a relatively short
period of time and there is this kind of implicit assumption in FWS and a lot of
the ESA arguments that the population was always here. Okay and we started
looking at the population and its actually down here and its working its way down
a little bit lower but there...There is no baseline. My personal opinion on it, being
a non-biologist is just and opinion, it doesn’t have any weight is that population
probably tends to do this naturally over time.” NFA
“I actually think the species is not necessarily endangered in the middle Rio
Grande right now, any more than it was thirty years ago or forty years ago.” NFA
“There is no science behind the 2003 BO. It appeared literally over night.” NFA
“And they maintained incredibly high flows because they didn’t know what a
desert species was and they treated everything like it was a cold water trout.”
NFA
“If you talk to some of the folks there about Dan Goodman, I think he was the
first time that we’ve had any kind of scientific credibility in the program.” NFA
“I think because a lot of people complain that what the service has been
mandating is draconian and not based on sound science.” FRA

AM is considered by all participants to be the mechanical “step in the right
direction” that the program needs to achieve clarity of science and decision protocol. This
is conditional “if” it is implemented correctly. This “if” leads the program into another
problem area. While each participant answered that it was certainly a good idea and
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useful paradigm from which to manage, nearly all participants felt that success was likely
dependent on the way it was implemented.
“I think AM will be the saving grace of this program if it can be employed
properly. Everyone is talking about it right now. No one in my opinion has
actually employed it here.” NFA
“When it is implemented and becomes part of the culture, you know we’ve paid
for several meetings and a report to try and get to AM. So now the funding for
that has kind of gone away so we will try and do a lot of this ourselves. AM is
important, because if you can set down a set of scientific questions that you need
to answer, to recover the fish then you can implement them and monitor them and
change as necessary and once something works or doesn’t you can get it out of
the program.” NFA
“AM in General has got to be the answer for the RIP, we have to be able to
change our ways of management depending on what the climatic situation is as
well as you know what we have learned with the fish or you know what we’ve
done differently among water management.” NFA
“I think its much more effective if we are doing AM in habitat restoration or
monitoring. But at this point it looks like the only form of AM that we are
actually trying to initiate are like “how do we run meetings?” And I think you
could just go to some sort of meeting management school to learn how to do that.
So to me that really doesn’t qualify as AM. They call it that but, they call it that.”
NFA
“Done correctly and embraced it is the absolutely the only salvation in my
opinion.” NFA
“I just think it’s a step in the right direction, I don’t think it solves anything but I
think that having a formal role for the scientific process just has to be helpful.”
FRA
“Absolutely, I think that AM would get us to hopefully a place where people
agree more on what the fish needs.” FRA
“It will definitely be, problem is how do you do it?” FRA

Some believed that it would not be possible to attain the level of methodical AM
implementation discussed in literature.
“I think that there are a lot of different views of adaptive management and I think
that you know, my view of the strict, must hypothesis test everything, is not
87

where we are probably going to be able to go because we are not going to have
the money to conduct a lot of, and I don’t even know how to set up a lot of those
hypothesis testing because.” NFA
Some believed that the way the federal government applies AM is insufficient. Many
made some statement about its success being dependent on what “they” believe AM is alluding to suspicion about how politics could affect implementation. Indeed, by the end
of the data collection process, participants were being asked to define AM. Most federal
and some non-federal participants gave a similar definition to that applied in the literature
review of this study. Some however, even if it appeared that they knew that definition,
defined it as reactive adaptation. Other participants freely admitted that they were not
confident everyone was on the same page. Entities with more or less confidence in the
program stated that AM was likely to manifest as influenced by the core power struggles
and politics of the program whether or not it was a useful paradigm. Obviously the
prospect of AM will have its challenges as it proceeds.
“Well, you have to understand what adaptive management means to each and
every one of them, they all think different things, to me it means different things,
to the federal government its different too?” NFA
“To us it means we adapt to the new environment, new resources, new processes.
That’s what adaptive management means.” NFA
“AM is a very methodical structured process of hypotheses analysis and testing.
Its very deliberate and measured and I continue to see people in the CP treating it
rather superficially, just tossing it out as kind of this “oh we’re just going to do
AM” and a lot of the people I think toss that out and most of the people that here
it think its well you try one thing and if it doesn’t work you try something else.”
NFA
“The program, the EC has committed to AM and exactly how that may look and
exactly what might be the results from that I don’t know.” NFA
“All adaptive management really means in my opinion is having the flexibility to
adapt to the existing conditions.” NFA
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“Sounds good on paper. In practice, I think the way it gets implemented by
federal agencies is let us be adaptive, its juxtaposed to prescriptive management
and I think AM that has as its cornerstone, prescriptions is fine.” NFA
“There’s no accountability frankly, because the adaptation is not to new science,
the adaptation is to the political and economic forces.” NFA
“I mean because in the past people have said the minnow, you know they just
burrow in the sand and they can live in the sand (laugh) and its not like that.
That’s not true. They need water.” FRA
“To me you know we all adaptively manage every day in our lives, you know you
try something, it doesn’t work, you try something else.” FRA
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7. Discussion
The origins of the program do begin with something like Karkainnen’s (2008)
destabilization events. Initially, the listing of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and
Southwestern Willow Flycatcher brought federal and state agencies to the table with
water appropriators to develop solutions to species problems. Environmental groups took
their lead in developing more ambitious strategies and the two groups met for over a year
in collaborative development of solutions. “Things got more serious” when the
environmental groups sued the Reclamation for failure to consult under Section 7”
(NFA). Litigation brought by water users contesting the Reclamation’s ability to take
SJCP water to supplement environmental flows increased tensions and some saw the
need to attend the issues in another way. Senator Domenici stepped in to draft the rider
that would require the collaborative program’s inception.
The existence of the superordinate goal is obvious in some participants’
enthusiastic recollections of the initial mood under Senator Domenici’s involvement.
“Yeah we can get this done in ten years and the whole edict was, Senator Domenici was
like we are going to get this problem solved in ten years damn it and move on” (NFA).
But, the 2003 BO made participation in the program the requisite (among more specific
activities under the RPAs) for coverage under the ESA and the Senator’s rider itself
removed some very important components of structural pressure on participants to
collaborate effectively. First, negating the court decision that Reclamation had legal right
to divert SJC water from contracted recipients to endangered species did several things.
(1) It changed the dynamics of cost share moving more of the burden to the federal side.
(2) It removed a resource that some participants felt offered the only parity between
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agricultural and municipal water interests in that both had stake in that particular
project’s water. Making SJCP water a monetary advantage increased the Water Utility’s
advantage over the MRGCD’s and its constituents’ because native6 Rio Grande water
was not stipulated to be available on a willing seller basis and the MRGCD gets much
less of the SJCP than the ABCWUA. While the MRGCD is shown to have its own means
of deflecting responsibility in Chapter 6.3.2, water rights holders view SJCP water’s “off
the table” status as unfair and dangerous to the future of agriculture itself in the MRG.
The MRGCD is said to deliver water for species needs and for Bosque del Apache
National Wildlife Preserve without legally mandated consideration of prior appropriation.
This is even more complex in light of the fact that the MRG is unadjudicated. This is the
origin of conflict over MRGCD’s record keeping as native Rio Grande water rights are
owned by assessment paying irrigators.
Second, the rider sheltered federal action agencies from litigation. Sheltering
factors are said to be culpable in a lack of real solutions and creative thinking coming out
of the long term process as well as specific infractions such as the failure to complete fish
passage by the 2008 deadline under the 2003 BO.
While these interventions are the kind of protections that might have been seen as
necessary for buy-in so that collaboration could initiate, in the long run all of these
sheltering alterations have reduced the level of pressure and thus incentive for individuals
to actively and dynamically seek solutions. Finally, it is said that restructuring the
program to emphasize the importance of parties with hard resources in negotiation
“hardened” the program into a “more federal-like bureaucracy” (NFA). It is said that the

6

Native in this context refers to water and rights to that water that are of and originate in the Rio Grande
Basin as opposed to water from trans-basin diversions such as the SJCP.
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Senator’s office was convinced that the more-diffuse collaboration of the early days was
spending too much money and was not able to generate the results needed in a timely
manner. While a logical conclusion, some parties feel that this emphasized a split
between certain kinds of stakeholders and is one responsible factor in the conspicuous
lack of ENGO’s at the collaborative table.
David Freeman (2010) signifies the need for periods of “regulatory cruising”
where stakeholders are able to stave off commitment of hard resources for long enough
periods to create coalitions that equalize or elevate incentive to participate among parties
who may not have incentive but could de-rail Program progress. It appears that in the
MRGESCP, this has been complicated by the reduction in pressure mechanisms that
would eventually force various groups to “pony up” resources. It has not been possible to
secure the support of ENGO’s and some trust relationships among non-federal actors
within the program are very much on a verification basis. Some if these dynamics were
described as potentially inducing program failure.
In terms of how the group has generated institutional supply, Ostrom’s questions
for evaluation of institutional supply reveal important elements of the investment
capabilities of the MRGESCP. As to how many players are involved, there are sixteen
program signatories at the time of this writing. While this is not a terribly unwieldy
number, there is debate as to how many should be involved and this debate seems to stem
from the power disparities established above and has much to do with internal group
structure. Most players exist somewhere within a hierarchy of authority, capacity and
political advantage with variable discount rates, sheltering advantages and need for
coverage. While some clusters of signatories can be made based on similar hierarchical
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levels there is little in the way of equality that can be drawn across the entire table. More
logical than seeking to evaluate equality within the MRGESCP, is to take a look at what
is actually still a top-down governance structure in a state somewhere on the way to being
a forum for equality. The focus of inquiry should then rest on nested symbiotic, quasiparasitic or adversarial/ alliance relationships between partners and to the program itself.
This inquiry can be accomplished with another of Ostrom’s questions, who
initiated the process? Or importantly in this case what? The ESA and its implementing
agency are the initial impetus for the existence of this program by way of litigation
generated and the intervention of powers at the congressional level. If we ask who paid
costs of entrepreneurial activities? We begin to see how these relationships interact. It is
said that the Bureau of Reclamation carried the weight of the federal 75% of the cost
share. The ISC supplied most of the 25% of the non-federal cost share but reportedly
makes a portion, be it large or small of that from Reclamation to begin with. Coupled
with the stated reality that cost share refers to Program activities (non-water, non-people)
while the dominant spending categories are water and staff, the non-federal cost share, by
a separate account is around 10%. The accuracy of those statements is certainly disposed
to disagreement but, by and large, the top-down nature of the authority hierarchy is
mirrored by the top down nature of the funding structure. Because this is an arrangement
structured as a zero-sum bargaining forum, the object of the regulated parties, as stated
above by a non-federal collaborator is to shift as much of the burden as is possible onto
the federal tax payer. These factors produce allegiances with duplicative voices in
symbiotic cycles of support such as the participant-described relationship between the
Bureau of Reclamation with its Tribal Trust obligations and Pueblos who reportedly tend
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to favor Reclamation’s positions. It produces adversarial or wary alliances where
duplicative voices disagree about the fate of a commonly represented resource such as
that of the APA and MRGCD. Finally, it creates a general atmosphere of quasi-parasitism
as regulated parties vie for regulatory shelter and economic support for their activities
while producing the least possible contribution instead of all parties laying down their
cards to attempt the productive problem solving that would heal the problems that
enlisted them to begin with.
To answer what kind of information do participants have about situation?:
information is a key issue when it comes to disputes about science and data management
especially in regard to who controls the science. It is a contentious issue within a number
of ESA based collaborations beside the MRGESCP that the regulatory body also
produces the science by which regulated actions are evaluated. But as Freeman (1997)
suggests in Chapter 4 of this study it is the same top-down, zero sum structure that
inhibits the regulatory agency from rescinding control of that position.
Information also comes to play in regard to risks and exposures experienced by
the parties involved. The legacy of state and federal interaction in control of water
resources manifests here with regard to the MRG in the title dispute between
Reclamation and the MRGCD. It also influences the strong distrust between FWS and the
ISC and New Mexico Attorney General. Each side would tend, in the absence of
collaborative benefits described in Chapter 6, to protect itself with dispensation of as little
information as possible. If FWS becomes completely transparent with its scientific
procedures and data, it risks being accused of ulterior objectives. If the MRGCD begins
to accurately account for its water dispersal for species needs, it will open itself to
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litigation from farmers though, on the MRG, their recourse through state adjudications to
enforce prior appropriation may be limited by the absence of such adjudication on the
MRG.
Highly important in regard to risks and exposures is the dominating incentive of
coverage pursued in various ways by partners in positions of influence to maintain a
status quo in their operations upset by the ESA.
The MRGESCP has both benefitted from and is systemically hindered by external
institutions. In benefits, the species of the MRG have a mechanism for protection in the
ESA. Appropriators have an opposing but similarly protective mechanism in state law.
The program receives funding from federal sources and received leadership and direction
from congress when Senator Domenici was involved. In hindrances, the same protections
are divisive and, the guiding hand of congress appeared to, in short-sightedness relieve
the program of some of its mechanisms for investment mobilization. It did so under bias
that redistributed risk and incentive in unproductive ways.
Possibly more importantly is the structure of responsibility under the ESA. First,
the ESA has regulatory “teeth” to attack only a narrow slice of the problem at hand with
the endangered species of the MRG. First and foremost it only attends to continued
involvement of federal agencies in actions that jeopardize endangered species7. On the
MRG, this results in a reduction of the ESA’s scope of influence to water management.
This is necessary, but ignores the fact that the habitat modifications that have endangered
the species to begin with are the result of activities that no longer have any federal
involvement. The building of Cochiti dam or improvement of diversion structures and
7

Since non-federal actors are included in Section Seven consultations on the MRG, “take” under Section 9
is omitted from this discussion.
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works and river channelization are all tasks that were completed long before the listing of
the species. This sets stakeholders to a dynamic of denying responsibility for making
fixes to those parts of the river that are geomorphologically altered by a century of
completed engineering while asserting the ecological benefits of their water use regimes.
These benefits include the existence of extra water in the stream from the SJC project, or
various return flow contributions made by agricultural uses.
Second, in relation to scope, the ESA focuses on the MRG because of the
existence of minnow populations there and only there at the time of its listing. While
there are experimental populations in two other parts of the Rio Grande system in Texas
and on the Pecos River, they are small in area. Thus the focus for species recovery is
confined to around 5% of its original range. The effect on species throughout the Rio
Grande system is the affect of the reduction of habitat in specific locations. In terms of a
species ability to sustain indefinitely however, the “whole” of these habitats in specific
locations is more than “the sum of its parts.” For millennia of unencumbered dynamics
on the Rio Grande, genetic viability of these species was the product of their entire range.
Focusing on the 5% of this range that the MRG constitutes is one of the factors that led
some participants to characterize the minnow as a “conservation-reliant species” now and
for as long as the river is managed for human uses on their current scale. Conservation
reliance refers to the need for a species to be continually managed through human
interventions. This is the case when a species’ habitat has been or will be drastically
modified to the extent that recovery without continued intervention for an indefinite
period is unlikely (Scott et al. 2005).
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As described in Chapter 6, the MRGESCP contains two important dynamics that
influence the Program’s potential success and fit it squarely in the context of the
collaboration versus “Rule of Law” dilemma. (1) The same conflict between resource
extraction and biological diversity that fueled the 1970s legislative trend away from
“interest group liberalism” and the formation of a rigid regulatory structure and culture is
active in the MRGESCP. ENGO participants cited, almost verbatim, the concerns
outlined by authors in Chapter 4. These groups are currently not a part of collaboration
and the Program’s tendencies as influenced by larger stakeholders have not convinced
ENGOs that their thinking is incorrect. (2) Disparities in influence where duplicate
representatives disagree with the more influential stakeholders about program trajectory
are grounds for dissent. In the worst case, dissenting entities have legal options that
threaten the program. This seems to require that the Program do what it can to alleviate
dissenters’ concerns. While many more influential entities cited the ideal that only those
with “resources and missions” should participate in the collaboration, they neglect the
reality that the resource held by dissenters is legal recourse and their missions may be
rooted in very different discount rates concerning livelihood and biological health of
systems that resource appropriators depend on.
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8. Conclusions
The Collaborative Program, for its complexity and problems, still exists in a state
where progress is highly possible. This study has framed the concept of stakeholders to
the Program to include entities not currently signatories to the process. This is because
they are included in a group of dissenters and possible dissenters within the Program that
have expressed grave concern for their position or for the Program. This concern is based
on a divide over disparities in influence within the collaborative forum and can be seen
on both sides of the social verses environmental interest divide. The problem for
investment of institutional supply within the program is based on a mischaracterization of
resources and missions as only those with value to specific entities. Because the divide
could bring about litigation that threatens the Program’s longevity, the situation fits
squarely within the dilemma of “rule of law” verses collaboration. If it is a given truth
among Program participants that the solutions that can be reached by collaboration are
better than those that can be reached in another fashion, these issues of disparity in the
MRGESCP should be attended.
Any solution to this problem contends with major structural difficulties. “We’ve
got this single thread system, it’s a zero sum game. Any water that goes through the
ecosystem environment has to come from some other use right? So there are really
limited options, you know a lot of systems, like systems on the west coast where there’s
multiple tributaries and they all have dams and reservoirs. You can do this various
trading and you know nobody really has to sacrifice as much as they do here to meet
those species needs but here, if there is going to be water in the river all the time for the
species, somebody is giving it up” (FRA).
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The Program is attempting to implement tools that are novel and still unproven in
terms of long-term benefit. Collaboration, as described above is wrought with the
dilemma of how far to move away from the system of rigid, prescriptive law that
guarantees certain protections, but utterly fails to attend to the scope and complexity of
environmental and social realities.
Adaptive management suffers from a lack of regulatory buttressing and as
demonstrated in this process is hindered by politics, lack of understanding and possibly
most important, the necessity of long term funding. Neither tool, however, can be said to
be falsely applied in the MRGESCP. The problems posed for either tool by the
MRGESCP are the problems posed for these tools generally. Whether or not the Program
will become a RIP and survive this period of growing pains may be another question.
Here it may manifest that these “new age” tools did not fit the specific circumstances of
the situation and time. The problem then is how to solve the problems that the Program
was conceived to attend to. According to participants, these tools are still the best option
they can think of for the collection of interests at stake.
It was stated by one federal partner representative and one regulated partner
representative that morale has suffered due to the amount of time and money put in to
developing the program and saving the minnow, only to find that a decade later the
minnow continues to suffer and the program is just as compromised as ever. It should be
noted here that the program on the Platte River, which has now become the model for the
MRGESCP (in its currently functioning state) is the product of litigation that originated
in the 1970’s. The program itself evolved out of relicensing problems that appeared in the
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mid-1990’s and the first MOA leading to what became the Platte River Recovery
Implementation Program in 2008 was signed in 1997.
Since 2008 that program has had the opportunity to develop itself in functional
form, in an adaptive science program with agreed rules, sufficient protections and a long
history of collaboration of the parties involved. By the end of the first increment of the
Platte River RIP, the endangered species issues on the river will be nearly 50 years old. In
phases of its evolution that more resemble what the MRGESCP is going through now, it
has been heavily, legally criticized and suffered from loss of environmental
representation and numerous in-fights among resource appropriators who stood to lose by
other representatives’ ideas or actions. While the Platte will certainly have its challenges,
its state is far different from that members of the MRGESCP encounter within their own
program. But the point is that members of the MRGESCP should not expect at this time,
that their problems’ solutions will be expedited. It should also be noted, as some of its
members have, that the species, social and political issues on the MRG are arguably more
complex than those on the Platte. There should be an expectation that this will be a much
longer, more expensive journey than it has already been.
It may also be time to realize that the only way to achieve something similar is to
not only persist, but to alter the game from the current zero-sum, “shell game” it has
become. Protections must be put in place on a conditional basis that protect the
collaboration and not specific parties’ interests while somehow recognizing each of these
interests as every program member’s personal goal. This may be the point at which the
comments on leadership are most important. If the influential partners to the program are
caught in a cycle of reinforcing their status quo operations, it may take substantially
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charismatic leadership with some authority to enforce change upon these parties. On the
Platte, protective guarantees took the form of ESA coverage for AM in the first 13- year
increment, sheltering parties from sanction for specific hazards to species if they were
effective through the AM mechanism in altering the circumstances that caused them
(Freeman 2010).
Of interest in the interview process, was the strained buy-in exhibited about the
various elements of proceeding to become a RIP. Participants seemed unsure of what lay
ahead. The program has committed to follow the model of the Platte River RIP. It was
noted in this study that multiple participants had David Freeman’s book, “Implementing
the Endangered Species Act on the Platte River Water Commons” on their shelves. Most
notably was the fact that few participants had been able to read it. The book is a major
contribution to this study and provides a comprehensive history of ten years of Program
related negotiation. While this study finds some disagreement with Freeman’s
conclusions, many of which are un-tested in terms their actual success on the ground, it
could be an invaluable tool to participants of the MRGESCP in developing the
institutions at least by which to agree on process.
Finally, Even if the species are to remain conservation reliant, the need for river
managers to learn how to manage “outside the box” is imminent. Already, the simple
problem of water allocation is compounded by climate change. The principles in Bates
(1988) and Ostrom (1990) in which soft communications enable reciprocal actions that
allow institutional change must be implemented as they can be among the MRG players.
Multiple suggestions are made by interview participants. In the words of one participant:
“Let’s do some things that are just good water management planning, even if there was
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no endangered species here because we’ve got climate change, we’ve got drought, we’ve
got things we’ve got to prepare for. Let’s develop flexibilities in our reservoir operations
and let’s make sure that we can store any type of water in any of those reservoirs and we
enhance the capacity as much as we can and then downstream, looking at the river below
the San Acacia Reach, that river is perched. It’s up above the groundwater. Connect that
thing, then we’ll use less water. There are things that people could be doing. But right
now everybody’s just focused on what’s the structure going to be?” The point is that
activity will enhance the ability of parties to contribute, if that activity is productive.
Parties can invest and test, because only with maximum buy-in will collaboration be safer
and the scope of real problems be attended.
The MRGESCP suffers from trust issues arising out of individual actions. But
those individual actions are deeply affected and arguably required under the status quo
elaborated in the discussion. Fault, while easily assigned based on simplistic precepts of
honesty, is as much a structural, strategic issue as a personality issue. Remedies to
individual personalities can only be attempted through buy-in of a core of constituents
united against dishonesty. This core buy-in is hindered by the protective nature of parties
in zero-sum negotiation. Altering the status quo greatly reduces the potential for its
existence. This may have to be done in “out of the box”, “what if there were no
endangered species” ways as described above.
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9. Limitations and Further Research
This research was limited predominantly by time. The shear number of facts to be
understood and the haphazard nature by which they were acquired or understood as
interviews proceeded greatly hindered the research process. If this were to be conducted
again, a much more comprehensive study of meeting minutes for several years, or
meeting attendance for a longer period would be advisable. Many other meetings of the
Program took place during this research, the Executive Committee meetings observed for
this project were likely not representative of dynamics to be found in smaller breakouts of
stakeholder groups. Finally, some stakeholders, due to time, limited contact with the
researcher (trust), or other variables caused some perspectives to remain unaccounted for.
It would be a goal of a repeated study to attend to as many perspectives as possible.
Analyzing mobilization of participation in ESA-driven collaboration in this way
would optimally be done in regard to a number of other similar programs. The scope of a
master’s thesis is too narrow to produce a comprehensive review of multiple program
histories, the regulatory and political climates in which they evolved, the variability in
structure based on management, stakeholders, and species issues and numerous other
components of ESA driven collaborative programs. Because of the interest and
prevalence of collaborative processes in many scenarios it seems a relevant topic. This is
especially true in Western water management, where these processes are overlaid with a
rigid set of “rule of law” regulations that so constrain available avenues. A book length,
comparative study of institutional supply mobilization in various programs would be
appealing as a means of understanding similarities and disparities among the programs.
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11. Appendices
Appendix A: Analytical Framework, Interview Instrument and Final Codebook
Analytical Framework and Interview Questions
Q1. Interests: a) What is the mission of (Partner)? b)What has been the role of
(partner) in the MRGESCP c) Is partner satisfied with this role?
Q2. How satisfied is (partner) with the program’s ability to develop mutually
beneficial exchanges/ options for the various partners?
Q3. How likely is it that all three of the MRGESCP’s stated goals can be
accomplished?
Q4. Are stakeholders equally burdened by the need for compliance? How has
buy-in been achieved?
Q5. Does (partner) feel secure in trust relationships with other partners? How
has trust been achieved?
Q6. Is the distribution of cost for the program activities fair? How was
provision of cost decided?
Q7. Is adaptive management/ transitioning to a RIP beneficial to (partner)?
Why?

Investment Mobilizing:
Interest Based
MI Environmental- including incentives that concern biodiversity,
intrinsic value of the river system or species, or preparing the MRG
ecosystem for bleak climate forecast. This is mobilizing depending on
stakeholder orientation to the goals of ESA and or resilience based
stewardship (Sax 2001,Chapin 2009, Craig 2009). Q1.
MI Social- including incentives that concern the longevity of the MRG
economy, traditional life-ways, camaraderie of entities involved in
decision making (Chapin 2009, Fisher and Brown 1988). Q1.
Relationship based
MR Collaborative- such that would-be adversarial interest-based goals
and cooperative interest-based goals are simultaneously reached (Fisher
and Ury 1981). Q2.
MR Program related concern (Proactive)-such as the ability of the
program partners to enhance relationships, to survive and function
proactively toward the three stated goals of the MRGESCP or find
replacements that offer some more feasible evolutionary state of the
program or alternative (Fisher and Ury 1981). Q3.
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Pressure Based
MP Incentive Building- Inventing for mutual gains, expanding available
options, cost share options (Ury and Fisher 1981) Q2.
MP Coverage- Expansion or contraction of flexibility, discretion, need for
coverage such that pressure increases/decreases (Doremus 2001, Freeman
2010) Q4.
MP Cost apportionment- Engineering of fair shares to increase pressure
(Freeman 2010) Q6.
Investment Hindering:
Interest Based
HI Preservative (Protection) of a status-quo interest such as water supply,
tradition such as agrarian or indigenous life-ways, or defense of some
level of bargaining advantage (Freeman 2010). Q1.
HI Advantageous such as economic gain, infrastructure
maintenance/improvement, political gain, shelter from some form of
individual sanction under the Endangered Species Act (Freeman 2010,
Ostrom 1990). Q1.
HI Program related concern (Status Quo) such as the ability of the
program to survive and function less effectively toward program goals but
in preservation of a given partner’s interest (Ostrom 1990). Q1.
Relationship based
HR Power dynamics- Dynamics are such that one or multiple groups’
resources and incentives make collaboration less likely for other partners
(Freeman 2010) Q4.
HR Trust- Compromise between parties is hampered by damaged trust in
relationships (Poitras et al. 2003) Q5.
Pressure Based
HR Cabining/Expanding of Agency Discretion in ESA administrationExpansion or contraction of flexibility such that pressure increases/
decreases (Doremus 2001). Q4.
HR Cost apportionment- Engineering of fair shares to relieve pressure
(Freeman 2010) Q6.
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Final Codebook
Logistical
Observation
Interview
Document
Subject Position
FRA Federal Regulatory/Action Agency
NFA Non-Federal Actor
SNC Strong Need for Coverage
WNC Weak Need for Coverage
EXST – Has some exogenous/structural advantage
RESources- Has resources, either water, land, monetary
DUPlicative- Disadvantageous, secondary
Analytical (Incentives/disincentives)
ADVantageous
PROgram related (supportive/unsupportive)
POWer dynamics
RELationships (trust/structural)
COSt related (individual/programmatic)
PREServative (economic, tradition, status quo)
INCentive building (mutual benefit, exchange)
COLlaboration
SOCial
ENVironmental
VOIce (group representation)
COVerage
DIScount rate (Skin in game)
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Appendix B: Index of Acronyms Used
AM
APA
BO
CEQ
CPR
CWA
EC
ENGO
EPA
ESA
FWS
ISC
kaf
MRG
MRGCD
MRGESCP
NEPA
NMFS
P&P
RIP
RPA
SES
SJCP

Adaptive Management………………………………………………………….
Assessment Payers' Association of the MRGCD………………………………
Biological Opinion…………………………………………………………..…
Council on Environmental Quality…………………………………………….
Common Pool Resource……………………………………………………….
Clean Water Act……………………………………………………………….
Executive Committee………………………………………………………..…
Environmental Non-Governmental Organization……………………………...
EnvironmentalProtection Agency………………………………………………
Endangered Species Act……………………………….……………………….
United States Fish and Wildlife Service………………………………..………
New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission……………………………...……
thousand acre-feet………………………………………………………………
Middle Rio Grande……………………….…………………………………….
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District……………………………………...
Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program……………...
National Environmental Policy Act……………………………………………
National Marine Fisheries Service……………………………………………..
Prior and Paramount……………………………………………………………
Recovery Implementation Program……………………………………………
Reasonable and Prudent Alternative…………………………………………..
Social-ecological System……………………………………………………...
San Juan-Chama Project………………………………………………………

112

20
17
8
9
18
8
6
2
9
7
7
17
13
4
5
1
9
7
15
6
8
20
12

